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Article 1

ARTICLES

Equity and Efficiency in Intellectual
Property Taxation
*

Xuan-Thao Nguyen† and Jeffrey A. Maine‡
INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property assets are integral to U.S.
businesses.1 Companies, large and small, expend substantial
*
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1
Consider, for example, Intellectual Ventures, a $5 billion startup company
founded in 2000, which has a patent portfolio of 27,000 patents. See Nigel Page, IV
Shifts Gears, 36 INTELL. ASSET MGMT. 8, 9, 10 (2009), http://www.intellectualventures.
com/Libraries/Article_Reprints/IAM_IV_story_July_-_Aug_2009.sflb.ashx
(reporting
the strategies of acquiring and creating inventions by Intellectual Ventures in the
United States and five Asian countries). The company accumulates patents from
individuals, companies, and its own laboratory in Bellevue, Washington, in a wide
range of fields to serve its numerous purposes, among them, the monetization of
intellectual property. Id. at 8-17 (discussing Intellectual Ventures’s monetization of
intellectual property by employing innovative business models). Intellectual Ventures
handsomely collects royalties from companies that use any of its patented inventions.
See Brier Dudley, Bellevue Lab Is an Inventor’s Real Dream, SEATTLE TIMES (May 27,
2009, 6:01 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/PrintStory.pl?document_
id=2009266390&zsection_id=2003907475&slug=intvent70&date=20090527. As of 2009,
the company had collected $1 billion in royalties. Id. It is now one of the top twenty-five
research institutions in the United States and one of the top fifty in the world based on
annual patent productivity. Id. Intellectual Ventures provides financing to many
companies and research universities to continue their invention productivities, and, in
†
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resources creating and developing products and services
covered by patents, copyrights, trade secrets, and trademarks.2
If businesses lack the expertise, facilities, financing, or time,
they license these intellectual property rights from others;
segmentation is the business modus operandi.3 For tax,
employment, and productivity reasons, multinational
companies shuffle and migrate their intellectual property
assets to favorable state and foreign jurisdictions. Some
companies leverage their intellectual property assets for
financing, while others leverage for litigation purposes.4
Because intellectual property assets are highly valuable,
companies seek different forms of intellectual property to
protect their products or services, bundling multiple
intellectual property rights.5
The importance of intellectual property to U.S. business
and the economy underscores the need for a sound tax policy
governing intellectual property rights. Presently, the Internal
Revenue Code contains several special rules governing
intellectual property.6 Some special tax provisions affect a large
group of intellectual property assets;7 most, however, cover only
return, Intellectual Ventures gains the ownership of or exclusive rights in patented
inventions. See Page, supra.
2
Government statistics reveal the high level of intellectual property
development activity in the United States. In 2008, the United States Patent Office
received 485,312 patent applications and of those granted 185,224 patents. U.S. Patent
Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963-2009, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Apr. 20,
2010, 1:04 PM), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (providing
statistics of patent applications and grants for each fiscal year). That same year, total
trademark filings at the Trademark Office covered 401,392 classes of goods or services
and 430,343 disposals, which are “abandonments of applications plus issued
registrations.” Trademark Pub. Advisory Comm., Annual Report, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. 4 (2008), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/advisory/reports/tpac_
2008annualrpt.pdf. Also during 2008, the Copyright Office received 561,428 copyright
claims, of which 232,907 were registered, as well as 526,508 copies of registered and
unregistered works valued at $24 million. Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request, U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFF. (Jun. 8, 2009), http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat060409.html. The
Copyright Office recorded more than 330,000 titles of works in fiscal year 2008. Id.
3
See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
4
See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Acquiring Innovation, 57 AM.
U. L. REV. 775, 791 (2008) [hereinafter Nguyen & Maine, Acquiring Innovation]
(describing how some companies without “resources, personnel, and facilities to
conduct further research and development or to create end products or services” realize
their returns on the patent portfolios by finding “potentially deep-pocketed infringers”
and forcing them to pay “through litigation and threat of injunction”); Xuan-Thao
Nguyen, Collateralizing Intellectual Property, 42 GA. L. REV. 1, 16-19 (2007)
(explaining how companies leverage intellectual property assets to obtain financing).
5
See infra Part IV.B.1.
6
Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Internal Revenue Code are to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
7
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 167(g)(6), 170(e)(1)(B)(iii), 170(m), 197 (2006).
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specific types of intellectual property.8 While these rules were
largely designed to address the shortcomings of traditional
taxation principles in the intellectual property context,9
ironically, many special tax rules are circumscribed in ways
that relegate the tax analysis back to these traditional
principles.10 Thus, the current income tax system governing
intellectual property is a mix of special tax rules and general
taxation principles.
Ideally, the current intellectual property tax system
should embrace the principles of fairness and efficiency. While
few would disagree that fairness and efficiency, in the abstract,
are important features of any tax policy, disagreement may
arise over the applied meaning of these two criteria. The first
criterion—tax fairness—is usually described in terms of
horizontal equity.11 Horizontal equity requires that persons who
are similarly situated should be taxed in a similar fashion.12 A
8

See, e.g., id. §§ 41, 167(f)(1), 167(g)(8), 174, 1221(a)(3), 1221(b)(3), 1235, 1253.
See infra notes 185-94 and accompanying text.
10
See infra notes 185-94 and accompanying text.
11
See JOHN A. MILLER & JEFFREY A. MAINE, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF
FEDERAL TAXATION 4 (2d ed. 2010); see also MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H.
SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 28 (6th ed. 2009).
12
See MILLER & MAINE, supra note 11, at 4; GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note
11, at 28. Horizontal equity has been compared to the constitutional principle of equal
protection under the laws. U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1; see also Richard A. Musgrave,
Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT’L TAX J. 113 (1990); Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Utilitarianism and Horizontal Equity: The Case for Random Taxation, 18 J. PUB.
ECON. 1 (1982).
Some modern theorists question the utility of horizontal equity in tax
policy analysis, contending that horizontal equity lacks independent significance and is
devoid of any normative content. See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti,
Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607,
607 (1993). For the actual debate between Professors Louis Kaplow and Richard
Musgrave over the merits of horizontal equity, see Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity:
Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 139 (1989); Louis Kaplow, A Note on
Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191 (1992) [hereinafter Kaplow, A Note]
(contending horizontal and vertical equity are aspects of the same principle);
Musgrave, supra; Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity: A Further Note, 1 FLA. TAX
REV. 354 (1993) [hereinafter Musgrave, A Further Note] (arguing horizontal equity has
independent significance distinct from vertical equity); see also Anthony C. Infanti, Tax
Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1193-94 (noting criticism of horizontal equity as lacking
independent significance); Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA.
TAX REV. 39, 89-97 (1996) (summarizing criticisms of horizontal equity).
Critics often point to the difficulty of determining relevant likeness (i.e.,
the comparison of taxpayers and economic activities). Kaplow, A Note, supra, at 192-93;
McDaniel & Repetti, supra, at 612-13. But see Musgrave, A Further Note, supra, at 359;
see also Zolt, supra, at 95 (“Defining horizontal equity as requiring equal tax treatment
for individuals who are, in all relevant aspects, equal accomplishes little. It just begs
the question of what is relevant. . . . The principle of horizontal equity does nothing to
determine which differences justify different tax treatment.”). Requiring equal
treatment for equals, they argue, merely begs the question of what equals actually are.
9
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related concept of equity is that economically equivalent
activities should be taxed in the same manner even if they
differ in form.13 Horizontal equity was once considered the
primary goal of tax policy,14 and even if no longer held in quite
this same regard, it nonetheless remains an important
principle of tax theory.15

But this objection rests on an “exaggerated view of the level of precision
required in order for equality to have meaning.” John A. Miller, Equal Taxation: A
Commentary, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 529, 545 (2000) (“All of our major tax schemes have
found ways to determine likeness (or difference) that are generally recognized as fair.”).
As one commentator notes, “[H]orizontal equity is concerned with individuals who are
‘similarly situated,’ not with those who are ‘identically situated.’” David Elkins,
Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 43, 44 (2006)
(“Tautologically, any conceivable tax arrangement will treat identically situated
taxpayers equally. . . . Taxpayers are similarly situated when their situations are
considered equivalent.”). Moreover, even if this criticism of horizontal equity is valid,
horizontal equity could nevertheless serve as a useful tool to uncover potential problems
in a tax system. See Jeffrey H. Kahn, The Mirage of Equivalence and the Ethereal
Principles of Parallelism and Horizontal Equity, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 651 (2006). For
example, the tax system’s differential treatment of two intellectual property owners that
appear to be in similar economic circumstances might signal a flaw in the intellectual
property tax system, or it might at least challenge us to justify disparate treatment.
Some critics also question the use of horizontal equity to analyze tax
expenditures (i.e., tax credits and deductions), arguing that a tax expenditure is a subsidy
that occurs outside of traditional tax equity analysis. McDaniel & Repetti, supra, at 621.
In the context of home ownership, Professor Miller has argued that horizontal equity
analysis can actually challenge us to justify disparate treatment between homeowners
and renters caused by the mortgage interest deduction. Miller, supra, at 537-38.
Likewise, in the context of intellectual property ownership, horizontal equity analysis can
challenge us to justify disparate tax treatment that exists between individual patent and
copyright creators and corporations whose employees invent or create.
13
See Kahn, supra note 12, at 647 (using the term “parallelism” for the
proposition that “the same or equivalent receipts, expenditures or losses should be
treated the same by the tax law”; non-parallelism “results in disparate tax treatment of
taxpayers who occupy similar positions”); Zolt, supra note 12, at 49 (using the term
“uniform taxation,” which rests on the concept of horizontal equity, “to refer to tax
treatment in accordance with some general approach . . . without any differentiation as
to type of income or type of taxpayer,” and using the term “nonuniform taxation” to
refer “to tax rules that vary by type of income or type of taxpayer”).
14
See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A
STUDY IN PUBLIC ECONOMY 160 (1959) (“Perhaps the most widely accepted principle of
equity in taxation is that people in equal positions should be treated equally.”); HENRY
C. SIMONS, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 11 (1950) (“Equity in this primary sense must, in an
advanced nation, predominate over, if not wholly override, all other objectives.”); see
also Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567,
574-80 (1965).
15
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 12 (discussing the merits of horizontal equity
analysis); Elkins, supra note 12 (showing independence of horizontal equity as a
principle of tax theory); Brian Galle, Tax Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1323,
1328, 1335-62 (2008) (providing justifications for tax fairness and claiming that
horizontal equity “can be defended as an essential feature of the revenue function of
taxation” and can operate on principles of its own); Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy
Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX REV. 645 (2003) (arguing equity and
efficiency, as opposed to simplicity, are core values); Kahn, supra note 12 (recognizing
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The second criterion of sound tax policy—efficiency—
has been measured by contradictory standards and means
various things in various contexts.16 Ideally, a tax system
should be administratively efficient; the costs of administering
and complying with intellectual property tax rules should be
minimized. Efficiency in tax theory can also be measured in
terms of economic growth.17 Under this standard, the
intellectual property tax system would be viewed as efficient if
it promoted economic growth18 and inefficient if it inhibited
such growth.19 Thus, tax subsidies—in the form of deductions,
credits, and lower tax rates—for certain intellectual property
activities might upset the free market allocations of capital, but

equal treatment of the same items serves the normative goal of fairness, but arguing
that parallelism need not necessarily prevail over other legitimate goals).
16
See MILLER & MAINE, supra note 11, at 4; see also GRAETZ & SCHENK,
supra note 11, at 29-30 (summarizing various meanings of the efficiency criterion).
17
Alternatively, efficiency can be viewed as a utilitarian concept that seeks a
balance between maximizing tax revenues and minimizing the social costs of taxation.
See MILLER & MAINE, supra note 11, at 4; Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income
Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 978-1012 (1986);
Herman P. Ayayo, Tax Expenditures: Useful Economic Concept or Budgetary
Dinosaur?, 93 TAX NOTES 1152 (2001); Zolt, supra note 12, at 63 (“Efficient taxes
distort as little as possible”; describing three forms in which distortions come).
According to this standard, an optimal intellectual property tax system would be
neutral—that is, it would not interfere with intellectual property owners’ economic
behavior and would avoid deadweight losses caused by restructuring of intellectual
property transactions to minimize taxes. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 11, at 29
(stating that efficiency requires that a tax interfere as little as possible with people’s
economic behavior); Elkins, supra note 12, at 47 (stating that efficient taxes minimize
deadweight losses caused by taxpayer actions to reduce tax burden by choosing courses
of action that minimize tax).
But this standard is of questionable value in the context of intellectual
property taxation. Most intellectual property tax rules are deliberately not neutral;
thus, under this standard, these rules generate high efficiency costs. Many of the
special tax provisions governing patents and copyrights, for example, were a deliberate
attempt to support the social-utility mandate of patent and copyright laws. Tax
expenditures in the form of deductions and credit for certain research and
development, and short write-off periods for certain intellectual property acquisitions,
were deliberately designed to drive economic decision-making to achieve more
important intellectual property social policies. Whether tax expenditures (i.e.,
deductions and credits used to influence behavior) represent sound tax policy has been
the subject of much debate. See, e.g., Zelinksky, supra; Ayayo, supra. In any event, at
least with respect to the intellectual property tax scheme, neutrality violations are
inevitable to achieve more important intellectual property social engineering policies
and to advance the public interest.
18
GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 11, at 29 (“The efficiency criterion
sometimes has other meanings. A tax often is said to be efficient when it promotes
economic growth and inefficient when it inhibits such growth.”); Edward Yorio, The
President’s Tax Proposals: A Major Step in the Right Direction, 53 FORDHAM L. REV.
1255, 1262-63 (1985) (examining economic growth as a principal criterion of sound
federal income tax policy).
19
GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 11, at 29.

6
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they might be justified because the targeted activities involve
significant beneficial externalities.20 And if these subsidies
correctly quantify society’s interests, according to the economicgrowth efficiency standard, they contribute to market
efficiency.21
The design of any tax system involves tradeoffs between
equity and efficiency principles.22 It may be efficient to provide
tax breaks to certain innovators because society as a whole
benefits from high innovation via encouragement of individual
effort through personal gain.23 But such measures may violate
horizontal equity because conflicts between equity and
efficiency are often inevitable byproducts. The government
must therefore establish reasonable tradeoffs when designing
an intellectual property tax system.24 For example, the
government might decide to grant equity primacy over
efficiency or vice versa.25 If inequity gives way to efficiency, a
certain level of inequity might be acceptable; in other words,
horizontal equity violations might sometimes be justified but
only if the efficiency gains are significant.26

20

Under an economic-growth efficiency standard, the tax system might be said
to be efficient even if neutrality violations upset the free market allocations of capital. For
example, if policymakers chose to adopt a lower tax on patent owners vis-à-vis copyright
owners to stimulate the economy, capital might flow from the copyright segment to the
patent segment as a result of the tax change.
21
Elkins, supra note 12, at 48 (“Where the economic activity concerned
produces beneficial externalities, a negative tax (i.e., a subsidy) may be offered. . . .
When the subsidy correctly quantifies society’s interests, it actually contributes to the
efficiency in the market.”).
22
See id. (arguing efficiency is not necessarily horizontally equitable); Miller,
supra note 12, at 541 (“Equity and efficiency principles will often coincide.”); Zolt,
supra note 12, at 85 (concluding that “nonuniform tax treatment may yield efficiency
gains not available under uniform taxation”).
23
Under the contradictory efficiency standard discussed supra note 17, some
would argue that such tax breaks to innovators violate the principle of neutrality by
encouraging taxpayers to choose patent activities over other intellectual property
activities. Under this view, the greater the inequity, the greater the inefficiency.
24
Elkins, supra note 12, at 68 (“[E]very tax system must allow some degree
of inequality in order to encourage beneficial economic activity.”); Zolt, supra note 12,
at 60-85 (examining choices where unequal treatment yields efficiency gains).
25
See Zolt, supra note 12, at 99 (While “efficiency and equity may conflict,
[o]ne approach could [be to] grant primacy to equity, regardless of efficiency
considerations.”).
26
Id. at 100 (“If efficiency gains are minor, then there may be strong reasons
for not adopting provisions that have inequity, or the perception of inequity. The
presumption should be in favor of uniform tax treatment where gains from nonuniform
treatment cannot be adequately justified. Where we can demonstrate substantial
efficiency gains, rejecting proposals on equity grounds becomes more problematic.”
(footnote omitted)).
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This article evaluates the current U.S. income tax
regime governing intellectual property by focusing on the
traditional principles of tax policy—tax fairness and efficiency.
It highlights the shortcomings of the current tax system in
fulfilling both of these tenets. It begins, in Part I, with an
overview of intellectual property rights, highlighting
substantive similarities and differences among patents,
copyrights, and trademarks. Part II turns to the current
intellectual property tax system. It evaluates the intellectual
property tax scheme in terms of horizontal equity, identifying
differences in tax treatment of what appear to be similar
intellectual property activities. Part III assesses the efficiency
of the intellectual property tax system. Specifically, it examines
numerous tax subsidies for intellectual property and their
effectiveness in promoting economic growth. It argues that
many of these tax expenditures are circumscribed to have
limited effectiveness and thus do not optimally contribute to
economic growth. It also argues that the current intellectual
property tax regime, with varying rules for different types of
intellectual property, does not provide necessary certainty and
clarity for sound administration and compliance with the law.
As an example, the intellectual property tax system is not
easily applied to evolving intellectual property rights and
trends, such as the bundling of intellectual property rights in
actual practice.
Finally, Part IV proffers guidelines for the government
in designing a more efficient and equitable tax system for
intellectual property. As to the efficiency criterion, a legal
framework should establish the proper role, if any, of the tax
system in promoting beneficial intellectual property activity.27
While the current tax system aims to promote the innovation
goals of patents and patent-like property through various tax
expenditures, it arguably hinders beneficial copyright and
trademark goals through the absence of adequate tax
incentives.28 This article questions this result, viewing most
intellectual property rights as achieving similar goals—namely,
innovation and/or efficiency policy objectives—and taking a
broad view of intellectual property’s positive effects on society.
As to the equity criterion, a legal framework should establish a
basis for rational tax distinctions among intellectual property
27
28

See infra Part IV.A-B.
See infra notes 211-34 and accompanying text.
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forms if distinctions are to be maintained. One solution would
be to base tax distinctions not on the legal attributes of
intellectual property, which has been the historical approach,
but on the intellectual property purposes that intellectual
property assets serve. Instead of developing separate tax rules
for identified intangibles, creating legal definitions and carving
out exceptions, different tax results could be dictated by
whether intellectual property is technology-based, marketingbased, or artistic-based—categories the government has
adopted for financial reporting purposes.
I.

OVERVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Before evaluating the intellectual property tax scheme,
it is useful to examine the nature of intellectual property
rights. In American law, “intellectual property rights often
cover . . . patents, copyrights, and trademarks.”29 In contrast to
tangible property, which is visible and has physical existence,
intellectual property is intangible and has no physical
existence.30 Intangible intellectual property rights are separate
29

See generally Nguyen, supra note 4, at 6. Computer technology poses
challenges to intellectual property doctrines. Copyright law has traditionally served as
the source of legal protection for computer programs. See Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic
Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he copyrightability of computer
programs is firmly established after the 1980 amendment to the Copyright Act.”).
Copyright law now defines computer software, extends the exclusive rights in a
copyright to copyrightable computer software, and imposes limitations on the exclusive
rights to allow certain statutorily noninfringing use of the copyrightable computer
software. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (2006). In addition to copyright law, patent protection
has been extended to computer software. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
30
Current tax rules for intangible intellectual property differ substantially
from tax rules for tangible property, with intellectual property treated less favorably
than tangible property in many instances. For example, the costs of purchasing certain
machines and equipment for active use in businesses are immediately deductible, see
I.R.C. § 179 (2006) (allowing taxpayers to elect to expense the costs of certain tangible
property), but the costs of purchasing intellectual property assets for use in businesses
are not and must be capitalized, id. § 263(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(i), -4(c)(1)
(2004). In addition, the purchase price for a computer can be written off over a period of
five years, I.R.C. §§ 167, 168(c), 168(e)(3)(B) (2006), but the purchase price for custom
software to run the computer must be written off over either three years or fifteen
years, depending on how the software was acquired, id. § 167(f) (providing a three-year
recovery period for separately acquired computer software); id. § 197 (providing a
fifteen-year recovery period for software acquired as part of the acquisition of a trade or
business). Similarly, a charitable contribution of a building provides the donor with a
tax deduction equal to the fair market value of the building, id. § 170(a); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-1(c) (as amended in 2008), whereas a charitable contribution of a patent
provides the donor with a deduction equal to the donor’s basis, I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(iii)
(2006). In these and other instances, the current tax system treats intellectual property
inconsistently with, and less favorably than, tangible property.
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from the physical objects containing the intellectual property.
Ownership of a book, for example, does not mean ownership of
the copyright of the book.
Patents and copyrights are substantively similar in
many respects. Patents and copyrights are both intangible
personal property.31 While neither has a physical form, both are
generally dependent on physical forms for their creative
existence.32 In addition, both confer similar exclusivity rights.
Just as patent owners can exclude others from using, making,
selling, or exporting their patented products,33 copyright owners
enjoy the exclusive right to make copies, prepare derivative
works, distribute the copyrighted work, and publicly perform
and display the work.34 The same clause of the U.S.
Constitution empowers Congress to promote the progress of
both science and the useful arts.35 In response, Congress has
granted significant protections for both patents and
copyrights.36
31

See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6:4
(4th ed. 2008) (“That there are many common characteristics of patents . . . and
copyrights cannot be denied. They all share the attributes of personal property, and are
referred to en masse as ‘intellectual property’ or ‘proprietary rights.’”).
32
See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Unnatural Rights: Hegel and Intellectual
Property, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 453, 499-500 (2006) (“[O]bjects of intellectual property
have no separate, natural, empirical existence. They ‘exist’ contingently and only
insofar as not only their creator, but also other subjects, recognize them as such.”); Dan
L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management Technology, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 538 (2005) (stating intellectual property is generally “embodied
in particular physical forms—on paper, on canvas, on magnetic or optical media—that
can be guarded from a physical theft”).
33
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006) (“[T]he
Patent Act also declares that ‘patents shall have the attributes of personal property,’
including ‘the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling
the invention.’” (citations omitted)).
34
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432-33
(1984) (“Copyright Act grants copyright holder ‘exclusive’ rights to use and to authorize
the use of his work in five qualified ways, including reproduction of the copyrighted
work in copies.” (citation omitted)).
35
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”).
36
Congress passed both patent and copyright legislation in 1790 during the
first congressional session. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (current version at
35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006)); Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (current version at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2006)). The patent statutes went through major revision in 1952.
See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (noting certain amendments to patent
statutes in 1952 and what Congress revised in that year); Graham v. John Deere Co. of
Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 12-17 (1966) (discussing the Patent Act of 1952). Copyright
laws witnessed two major revisions: the Copyright Act of 1909 and the Copyright Act of
1976. See Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075; Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)); see also Lotus Dev. Corp.
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Copyrights include the exclusive rights to make copies,
prepare derivative works, distribute the works, display the
works in public, and perform the works in public.37 Copyright
law requires that a work of authorship be original and fixed in
a tangible medium of expression.38 Works of authorship cover a
wide range of subject matters—for example, movies, video
games, software, music, and books;39 originality means that the
works must be created independently by the author and must
bear some degree of creativity.40 The bundle of rights does not
last forever, however, as it faces a time limit.41 This time
limitation is consistent with the Founding Fathers’ intent in
drafting the Patent and Copyright Clause. While the Founding
Fathers clearly sought to award authors exclusive rights to
their works—based on the belief that a reward-based system
would “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”42—they
also understood that an unfettered right would do little to
promote such cultural progress and therefore placed a time

v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 47-51 (D. Mass. 1990) (discussing changes
and legislative history of copyright statutes).
37
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 495 n.4 (2001); see also 17
U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (“Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under
this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works,
including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to
display the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”).
38
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . from which they
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated . . . .”).
39
Id. § 102(a) provides a list of categories for works of authorship: “(1)
literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic
works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual
works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.”
40
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358-59 (1991)
(stating that “[o]riginality requires only that the author make the selection or
arrangement independently . . . and that it display some minimal level of creativity.
Presumably, the vast majority of compilations will pass this test, but not all will. There
remains a narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so
trivial as to be virtually nonexistent.” (citation omitted)).
41
See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
42
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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limit on the exclusivity for copyrights, the same as they did for
patents.43
As with patents, the exclusive rights in copyrights,
though limited in time, are granted to encourage the progress
of science and the useful arts for the benefit of society.44 There
is a long-held belief that copyright protection promotes
innovation and the “creative activity of authors,”45 and induces
authors and artists to “release to the public . . . the products of
his creative genius.”46 Technological advances in the
reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works, however,
force new changes in copyright law, as Congress continually
searches for a balance between copyright protection47 and
future innovations.
Despite their similarities, there are many substantive
differences between patents and copyrights. For example, the
legal life of a patent is dictated by the federal patent statute
and lasts twenty years from the date of patent application.48
The legal life of a copyright under the federal copyright statute
is much longer; it spans the life of the original author plus
43

Id.
See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and
useful Arts.’”); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)
(“The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary
consideration. . . . It is said that reward to the author or artist serves to induce release
to the public of the products of his creative genius.”).
45
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(explaining that “[t]he monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the
limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a
special reward”). But see Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94
MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1205, 1209, 1213-15 (1996) (arguing that “demonstrating how
neither the need to generate creative activity nor the desire to reward deserving
authors provides a plausible justification for current copyright doctrine”).
46
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 158; see also Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy
Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer
Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 288-89 (1970) (examining the “property” right in
copyrights and asserting that “property rights are often created for reasons of
efficiency” rather than “solely on the basis of labor expended”).
47
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (“[T]he Copyright Clause
empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that
body’s judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause. . . . Congress may ‘implement the
stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best
effectuates the constitutional aim.’” (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,
383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966))).
48
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (providing that the patent term is twenty years
from an effective filing date).
44
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seventy years after the author’s death.49 If the author is an
entity, the life of the copyright is 120 years from the date of
creation or 95 years from the date of publication, whichever
expires first.50
In contrast to patent and copyright laws, Congress
relied on the Commerce Clause to pass the trademark
statutes.51 Unlike patent and copyright laws, trademark laws
do not exist to reward trademark owners for innovations of
products or services.52 Rather, trademark laws are recognized
as important to facilitate efficiency.53 Specifically, trademark
laws prevent competitors from copying source-identifying
marks and minimizing the likelihood of consumer confusion.54
Consumers can rely on the trademarks in their decision of
whether to purchase a product or service.55 Consequently,
trademark laws reduce the consumers’ costs of shopping and
making purchasing decisions and help assure “a producer that
it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial,

49

17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
17 U.S.C. § 302; see also Thomas F. Cotter, Toward a Functional Definition
of Publication in Copyright Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1724, 1733 (2008) (reviewing the
statutory provision for the legal life of a copyright created by natural authors and
works made for hire).
51
Nguyen, supra note 4, at 8.
52
See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29, (2001).
“The Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in
creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of
exclusivity.” Id. at 34. Federal trademark law “has no necessary relation to invention
or discovery.” In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
53
See Int’l Bancorp, L.L.C. v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle Des
Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 381 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that “the very real
interest that our trademark laws have in minimizing consumer confusion” is to ensure
“that our economy may enjoy the greatest possible of efficiencies”). William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265,
265-66 (1987) (“Our overall conclusion is that trademark law . . . can best be explained
on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote economic efficiency”).
54
See Berner Int’l Corp. v. Mars Sales Co., 987 F.2d 975, 982 (3d Cir. 1993)
(commenting that “[t]rademark protection is desirable because of the efficiencies and
incentives produced by symbolic affiliation of producer and quality product”).
55
Many commentators also believe that trademarks foster efficiency in
information and search costs “‘by providing a compact, memorable and unambiguous
identifier of a product or service.” Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal
Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143,
1148 (2006) (quoting Richard Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67,
75 (1992)).
50
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EVALUATING EQUITY IN THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
TAX SYSTEM

Having introduced the characteristics of intellectual
property rights, we turn to the current tax system governing
those rights. Ideally, the income tax regime for intellectual
property transactions should embrace the principle of fairness.57
Unfortunately, it is difficult to evaluate a tax system governing
intangible rights from an equity perspective because these
rights involve such a broad range of economic activities that no
two taxpayers will be situated exactly equally. For example,
should a person selling a literary copyright and a person selling
a musical copyright be treated as equals for tax purposes?
Should a seller of computer software protected as a patent be
viewed as similarly situated to a seller of similar computer
software that is protected as a trade secret? Should a purchaser
of a domain name functioning as a trademark be considered
equal to a purchaser of a generic domain name? Is a person
who donates intellectual property to a large university engaged
in applied research similar to a person who donates similar
intellectual property to a small college engaged in
fundamental, purely scientific research?

56

Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995). As
explained by the Court in Qualitex,
In principle, trademark law, by preventing others from copying a sourceidentifying mark, “reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making
purchasing decisions,” for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer
that this item—the item with this mark—is made by the same producer as
other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At
the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating
competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated
with a desirable product. The law thereby “encourage[s] the production of
quality products,” and simultaneously discourages those who hope to sell
inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer’s inability quickly to evaluate
the quality of an item offered for sale.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and the
Transformation of Trademark Law, 38 N.M. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) (stating that trademark
law promotes efficiency as consumers reduce their research cost by relying on brand
names); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1841-43, 1848 (2007) (critiquing the law and economic approach to
trademark law which emphasizes economic efficiency of trademark law purposes).
57
See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
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Viewing all intellectual property owners as equals and
treating them equally for tax purposes would have unarguable
appeal. Consider the general tax treatment of both patents and
copyrights. The legal protections granted to patents and
copyrights are very similar in substance—both essentially
functioning as grants of monopolies.58 If the intellectual
property system treats patents and copyrights similarly, the
tax rules designed to support the system might also treat them
similarly—an approach that seems consistent with tax notions
of fairness.59
A fundamental problem with the current intellectual
property tax system, however, is inconsistency. Patent and
copyright owners are treated equally in some tax contexts but
unequally in others. For example, the acquisition costs of
patents and copyrights are treated similarly for tax purposes,60
as are patent and copyright donations.61 But the taxation of
development costs differs between patents and copyrights.
Patent development costs are deductible when incurred,62
whereas most copyright creation costs must be capitalized.63
Likewise, sales of self-developed patents are generally entitled
to preferential capital-gains treatment,64 while sales of most
self-created copyrights are generally not.65
58

See supra text accompanying notes 31-47.
See supra text accompanying notes 11-15.
60
See I.R.C. §§ 197(a), (e)(4)(C) (2006) (providing a fifteen-year amortization
period for patents and copyrights acquired in a transaction involving the acquisition of
assets constituting a trade or business); see also id. § 167; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-3 (as
amended in 2004), 1.167(a)-14 (as amended in 2006) (providing alternative
depreciation rules for patents and copyrights acquired separately).
61
See I.R.C. §§ 170(a), (e)(1)(B)(iii) (2006) (limiting initial charitable
contribution tax deduction to adjusted basis in donated patents and copyrights).
62
See id. § 174(a) (allowing taxpayers to “treat research or experimental
expenditures which are paid or incurred . . . during the taxable year in connection
with . . . trade or business as expenses which are not chargeable to capital account”);
id. § 263(a)(1)(B) (providing that the capitalization rules under section 263(a) do not
apply to “research and experimental expenditures deductible under section 174[a]”).
63
See id. § 263(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(iii), -4(b)(3), -4(d)(5) (2004)
(requiring capitalization of costs of obtaining rights from a governmental agency, as
well as costs of creating any “separate and distinct intangible asset”); see also I.R.C.
§ 263A(a)-(b) (2006) (requiring capitalization of all direct and indirect expenditures
incurred to produce creative properties, such as films, sound recordings, video tapes,
books, and similar properties that embody the words, ideas, concepts, images, or
sounds by the creators thereof). But see id. § 263A(h) (providing an exception from the
capitalization requirement, permitting certain freelance writers, photographers, and
artists to deduct any “qualified creative expense” that would otherwise be capitalized).
64
See I.R.C. § 1235 (2006) (providing statutory assurance to certain individual
inventors that the sale of their patents will qualify for reduced capital-gains rates).
65
See id. §§ 1221(a)(3) (excluding from the definition of capital asset a
literary, musical, or artistic composition, or similar property held by the creator),
59
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To be sure, there are distinctions between patents and
copyrights.66 But even if patent owners are different from
copyright owners, based on tax equity principles, two patent
owners that are similarly situated, or two copyright owners
whose situations are similar, should be taxed in a similar
fashion. Under the current intellectual property tax regime,
however, this is not the case, raising serious equity concerns.67
A.

Inequities in the Tax Treatment of Intellectual Property
Development Costs

Since the inception of the modern federal income tax
system, the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) has precluded
a current deduction for so-called “capital expenditures,”
historically defined as any expenditure that produces an asset
lasting beyond the current tax period.68 With respect to
intellectual property development expenditures, though,
Congress has specifically legislated specific exceptions to asset
capitalization,69 and the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”)
has administratively created additional exceptions.70 These
legislative and administrative exceptions to normative
capitalization have inequitable results. The following example
is illustrative.
1231(b)(1)(C). But see id. § 1221(b)(3) (providing an exception for sales of musical
compositions and copyrights in musical works).
66
See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
67
Many of the inequities identified here in the tax treatment of intellectual
property do not exist in the tax treatment of tangible real or personal property.
68
Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (providing “[t]hat no
deduction shall be allowed for any amount paid out for new buildings, permanent
improvements, or betterments, made to increase the value of any property”). For the
current disallowance provisions, see I.R.C. §§ 263, 263A (2006). The reason capitalized
expenditures are not currently deductible is that the property created or acquired is
not consumed or used up within the year, but rather continues to contribute to income
over a period of years. If the costs incurred in the creation or acquisition of such
property were deductible in full in the current year, there would be a mismatch of
income to expenses that produced that income; income would be understated in the
year of creation or acquisition and overstated in later years. By prohibiting the
immediate deduction of capital expenditures, this problem is avoided.
69
See I.R.C. §§ 174 (allowing a deduction for research and experimental
expenditures that would otherwise be capitalized), 263A(h) (allowing a deduction for
qualified creative expenses incurred by freelance authors, writers, and photographers
that would otherwise be capitalized) (2006).
70
See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(iii), -4(b)(3)(v) (2004) (allowing a
deduction for graphic and package design costs even though long-term trademark and
copyright protections are obtained on such designs); Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303,
updated by Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-2 C.B. 601, modified and superseded by Rev. Proc.
2007-16, 2007-1 C.B. 358 (allowing a current deduction for software development costs
regardless of method length of intellectual property protection).
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Consider two novice inventors, Inventor A and Inventor
B. Each spends $100,000 to develop her first patented
invention. Inventor A plans to enter a future business of her
own with her developed technology, marketing the technology
herself. Inventor B, however, plans to license his developed
technology to a company that will market the developed
technology to its customers. Inventor A and Inventor B appear
similarly situated; each spends $100,000, and each obtains
patent protections for similar technologies that will be
exploited in the commercial marketplace. Nevertheless, under
the present tax system, Inventor A and Inventor B are not
treated equally. Inventor A may currently deduct $100,000 in
research costs, but Inventor B may not. This disparate
treatment stems from Section 17471 of the Code, which allows a
current deduction only for research expenditures incurred “in
connection with” the inventor’s trade or business.72 While a
taxpayer need not be currently conducting a business (i.e.,
producing or selling any product) for research or experimental
expenditures to meet Section 174’s “in connection with a trade
or business” requirement,73 courts have required that a
taxpayer show a realistic prospect of entering into a trade or
business in the future that will exploit the technology under
development.74 To do so, the taxpayer must demonstrate both
an objective intent to enter into the trade or business, and the
ability to perform the business.75
71

I.R.C. § 174(a) (2006).
Id.
73
Prior to 1974, the IRS and the courts took the position that to qualify for
Section 174 treatment, a taxpayer must already have engaged in a trade or business.
See Best Universal Lock Co. v. Comm’r, 45 T.C. 1 (1965), acq., 1966-2 C.B. 4 (1966);
Koons v. Comm’r, 35 T.C. 1092, 1098, 1100 (1961). The U.S. Supreme Court rejected
this narrow approach and held that pre-operational research or experimental
expenditures could qualify for the Section 174 deduction. Snow v. Comm’r, 416 U.S.
500, 503-04 (1974).
74
Kantor v. Comm’r, 998 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he taxpayer must
demonstrate a ‘realistic prospect’ of subsequently entering its own business in connection
with the fruits of the research, assuming that the research is successful.”); see also Zink v.
United States, 929 F.2d 1015, 1023 (5th Cir. 1991); Spellman v. Comm’r, 845 F.2d 148,
149-50 (7th Cir. 1988); Stauber v. Comm’r, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2258 (1992); Diamond v.
Comm’r, 92 T.C. 423, 439 (1989), aff’d, 930 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1991).
75
See Kantor, 998 F.2d at 1518-19 (holding that the partnership possessed
neither “the objective intent nor the capacity of entering such a business” at the time it
incurred research expenditures); Diamond, 930 F.2d at 375 (“The question is not
whether it is possible in principle, or by further contract, for [the taxpayer] to engage in
a trade or business, but whether, in reality, the [taxpayer] possessed the capability in
the years before the court to enter into a new trade or business in connection with the
[products being developed].”); Glassley v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2898 (1996)
72
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As a general rule, the receipt of royalties alone does not
constitute a trade or business.76 In one recent case, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed a Tax Court decision that denied current
deductions to a computer software developer who did not
market the developed technology himself, but instead licensed
the technology to another company for use in that company’s
trade or business.77 The court concluded that mere licensing of
the developed technology did not meet the requisite trade or
business standard in the statute. A few Tax Court decisions
have held that research activities, and exploitation of the
resulting inventions by sale or license, may constitute a trade
or business.78 But these cases involved inventors who had
developed a series of inventions.79 Thus, in practice, Section 174
fails to recognize the important role of technology licensing and
favors only inventive activities of a sufficiently sustained
character.
As with patent development activity, not all
economically equivalent copyright creation activities are
treated equally for tax purposes. As crafted, the legislative and
administrative exceptions to the asset-capitalization rule
produce different tax results depending on the status of the
copyright creator—as an individual versus a corporation—and,
in some cases, on the nature of the property embodying the
copyright.80 In general, costs incurred in creating works that
are subject to copyright protection are not currently

(denying Section 174 deductions for expenditures to develop jojoba plants and seeds
because taxpayer had neither intent nor capability to enter jojoba farming business).
76
See H.R. REP. NO. 97-201, at 113 (1981) (laying out rules for the
application of Section 174, but not explicitly naming licensing as a trade or business
that entitles taxpayers to relief under that provision).
77
Saykally v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1401 (2003), aff’d, 247 F. App’x 914
(9th Cir. 2007).
78
See Kilroy v. Comm’r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 292, 295 (1980) (permitting
deductions where actions, over a period of years, relating to inventing activities
suggested taxpayers were engaged in the trade or business of inventing); Louw v.
Comm’r, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1421, 1422-23 (1971) (permitting deductions since taxpayer’s
freelance inventive activities were of sufficiently sustained character to qualify as
engaging in a trade or business of an inventor); Avery v. Comm’r, 47 B.T.A. 538, 542
(1942) (permitting business deductions where taxpayer “held the patents [to his
inventions] for sale or license to others for profit”).
79
See Kilroy, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) at 295 (“numerous patents”); Avery, 47 B.T.A.
at 540 (“about a dozen patents”). But see Cleveland v. Comm’r, 297 F.2d 169, 173 (4th
Cir. 1961) (deeming a single invention held by a joint venture to be sufficient).
80
The nature of the copyright creator (individual versus entity) can produce
different tax results. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. The nature of the
property embodying the copyright can also produce different tax results. See supra
notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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deductible,81 but Congress has carved out a narrow exception
for certain costs incurred by individual writers, photographers,
and artists when engaged in their respective trades.82 As a
result, expenses incurred by an individual author in writing a
book are currently deductible, but similar creative costs
incurred by a book publishing company (costs of writing,
editing, and designing) must be capitalized.
Although corporate taxpayers must generally capitalize
copyright creation costs, capitalization is not required if the
subject of copyright protection is computer software83 or certain
advertising materials.84 As a result, a corporation may not
deduct the costs of developing copyrighted books, films, or
songs, but it may deduct the costs of developing copyrighted
software, graphic designs, and package designs used in
advertising. Ironically, the value produced in each case lies not
in the different tangibles embodying the copyright, but in the

81

Section 174 does not apply to copyright creation expenses because such
expenses do not constitute “research and experimental expenditures” within the
meaning of Section 174. See Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1)-(2) (as amended in 1994).
Section 162 generally does not apply to copyright creation costs as the Code requires
such costs to be capitalized. See I.R.C. § 263(a) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4 (2004)
(requiring capitalization of costs of obtaining rights from a governmental agency, as
well as costs of creating any “separate and distinct intangible asset”); see also I.R.C.
§ 263A(a)-(b) (2006) (requiring capitalization of all direct and indirect expenditures
incurred to produce creative properties, such as films, sound recordings, video tapes,
books, and similar properties that embody the words, ideas, concepts, images, or
sounds by the creators thereof).
82
I.R.C. § 263A(h) (2006) (providing an exception from the capitalization
requirement, permitting certain freelance writers, photographers, and artists to deduct
“qualified creative expenses” that would otherwise have to be capitalized).
83
Under a longstanding administrative ruling, software development costs
are treated the same (i.e., currently deductible) regardless of whether the software is
protected by patent, copyright, or trade secret. See Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303,
updated by Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-2 C.B. 601, modified and superseded by Rev. Proc.
2007-16, 2007-1 C.B. 358.
84
As a general rule, the government allows taxpayers to currently deduct
advertising costs notwithstanding the fact that advertising often produces benefits that
continue well beyond the current taxable year. See Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57.
Only in unusual circumstances must the costs be capitalized, such as where
advertising is directed toward obtaining future benefits significantly beyond those
traditionally associated with ordinary product, institutional, or goodwill advertising.
Id. Advertising expenditures often encompass the costs of creating materials that are
copyrighted. An interesting question is whether the long-term intangible benefits
provided by copyright protection should serve as the basis for requiring capitalization
of advertising campaign expenditures. Or, should such costs be deductible because they
resulted from “advertising” activities? In one case, the Tax Court allowed trade dress
and copyright development costs to be deducted, even though such costs in a nonadvertising context most likely would have to be capitalized. R.J.R. Nabisco Inc. v.
Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 71 (1998).
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intangible copyright protections themselves.85 Even if the
copyright protections are identical in each case, the tax
consequences to the corporate creators differ significantly.86
B.

Inequities in the Tax Treatment of Intellectual Property
Acquisition Costs

Inequities in the tax treatment of intellectual property
acquisition costs are also prevalent. Under the current tax
system, the costs of acquiring intellectual property must first
be capitalized87 and then are subject to a host of irrational tax
depreciation rules.88 The methods89 and periods90 for recovering
85

Holders of copyrights enjoy the exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute,
display, perform, and prepare derivatives of the works of authorship. That means
holders of copyrights have more rights than mere ownership of the physical copy of the
works of authorship. Michael J. Madison, Notes on a Geography of Knowledge, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2071 (2009) (“[T]he physical ‘copy’ is excluded from the scope of
copyright and the intangible ‘work’ or ‘work of authorship’ is regarded as the fruit of
the author’s creative labors. The authority of the copyright itself, therefore, inheres in
something other than the material form of the product. . . . A copyright in a novel
covers the full text of the book, but it may also extend separately to its plot or even to a
particular character.”); Gary Pulsinelli, Harry Potter and the (Re)Order of the Artists:
Are We Muggles or Goblins?, 87 OR. L. REV. 1101, 1107 (2008) (“Copyright law is
concerned only with rights in the artistic design of an object, not with the right to the
physical possession of a tangible object embodying that design.”); Ned Snow, Copytraps,
84 IND. L.J. 285, 296 (2009) (noting that copyright holders exercise their reproduction
and distribution rights under copyright law when they sell physical copies of their
copyrighted works to consumers).
86
For a discussion of copyright protections, see supra notes 31-47 and
accompanying text.
87
I.R.C. § 263 (2006); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(i), -4(c)(1) (2004) (“A
taxpayer must capitalize amounts paid to another party to acquire any intangible
[property] from that party in a purchase or similar transaction.”).
88
In an economic sense, depreciation is the decline in value of an asset due to
wear and tear and obsolescence. For tax purposes, depreciation is a deduction from
income, permitting the taxpayer to recover the capitalized cost of that asset.
Depreciation methods are sometimes called cost recovery systems. So, for example, if
an asset used in business for five years costs a taxpayer $5000, the taxpayer might
take a $1000 deduction each year on her taxes for five years to reflect the decline in
value of that asset and to reflect its contribution to the production of taxable income.
The entire cost of the asset is not deducted all at once because the asset helped produce
income over five years. To match the taxpayer’s expenses against the revenues they
helped produce, the taxpayer must spread out the deduction over the useful life of the
asset. See generally MILLER & MAINE, supra note 11, at 118-22.
89
Capitalized intellectual property costs are depreciated using either the
straight-line method or the income-forecast method depending on a number of factors. See
I.R.C. §§ 197(a), (e)(3)-(4) (2006) (requiring straight-line method for intellectual property
acquired in connection with the acquisition of assets that constitute a trade or business);
see also id. §§ 167(a), (g)(8); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 2004), -14 (as
amended in 2006), (b)-1 (as amended in 1960) (allowing either the straight-line method or
the income-forecast method for intellectual property acquired separately). Accelerated or
“bonus” depreciation methods that are available for depreciable tangible property are not
available for intangible property. See I.R.C. § 168(b) (2006). But see I.R.C. §§ 197(e)(3),
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capitalized intellectual property acquisition costs vary by the
type of intellectual property acquired,91 the manner of
procurement,92 and even the method of payment.93 Prescribed
recovery periods, for example, range from three to fifteen years,
179(a), (d)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) (permitting taxpayers to elect to deduct the cost of purchasing
off-the-shelf computer software).
Under the straight-line method, acquisition costs are deducted ratably over
the asset’s useful life or over a statutorily prescribed recovery period. Under the
income-forecast method, acquisition costs are recovered as income is earned from
exploitation of the patent. Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68, supplemented by Rev. Rul.
64-273, 1964-2 C.B. 62, supplemented by Rev. Rul. 79-285, 1979-2 C.B. 91. The
depreciation allowance in any given year is computed by multiplying the original
acquisition cost by a fraction, the numerator of which is income from the intellectual
property for the taxable year and the denominator of which is forecasted or estimated
total income to be earned in connection with the intellectual property during its useful
life. Id. Consider the following example. In Year 1, Taxpayer purchases a patent for
$100 and estimates that forecasted total income from the patent will be $200. In
Year 1, the patent generates income of $80. The depreciation allowance for Year 1 is
$40, computed by multiplying the acquisition cost of $100 by the fraction obtained by
dividing current year income of $80 by forecasted total income of $200. Under this
approach, 40% of forecasted income was earned in Year 1, so 40% of the total purchase
cost was deducted in Year 1. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(n)-4(b).
90
Some types of intellectual property are depreciated over an arbitrary
fifteen-year period regardless of the intellectual property’s legal or useful life. See
I.R.C. §§ 197(a)-(b), (d)(1)(C)(iii), (d)(1)(F) (2006). Other types are depreciated ratably
over their useful life (i.e., under the straight-line method). Id. §§ 167(a), 197(e)(3)-(4);
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 2004), (a)-14 (as amended in 2006), (b)-1 (as
amended in 1960). Others are depreciated only as the intellectual property generates
income (i.e., under the income-forecast method). I.R.C. § 167(g)(8) (2006); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.167(a)-14 (as amended in 2006). As with the appropriate depreciation method, the
appropriate recovery period depends on a number of factors.
91
For example, trademarks, trade names, trade secrets, and know-how are
depreciated over fifteen years. I.R.C. §§ 197(a)-(b), (d)(1)(C)(iii), (d)(1)(F) (2006). Patents
and copyrights acquired separately are depreciated over their useful lives under either
the straight-line method or income-forecast method. Id. §§ 167(a), (g)(8); Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 2004), -14(a) (as amended in 2008). Computer software
acquired separately is generally deprecated over three years. I.R.C. § 167(f) (2006).
92
Intellectual property may be acquired in a transaction involving the
acquisition of a trade or business or may be acquired separately or with a group of
assets that collectively do not constitute a trade or business. For many types of
intellectual property, such as patents, patent applications, and computer software,
depreciation rules differ depending on the method of procurement (i.e., Section 197
applies only if these assets are acquired with a business). See I.R.C. § 197(e)(3)-(4)
(2006). For other types, such as trademarks, trade names, trade secrets and know-how,
method of procurement is irrelevant (i.e., Section 197 applies regardless of whether
these assets are acquired separately or with a business). See id.
93
As consideration, intellectual property transferees may make up-front
principal payments, installment payments of a fixed amount, payments contingent on
exploitation of the intellectual property, or use any combination of these methods.
When contingent payments are made, depreciation rules differ depending on whether
the intellectual property is acquired separately or acquired with a trade or business.
For example, if a contingent payment is made for a patent acquired with a business,
the contingent amount is written off over a fifteen-year period. Treas. Reg. § 1.1972(f)(2)(i) (as amended in 2008). If a contingent payment is made for a patent acquired
separately, then the contingent amount is fully deductible in the year paid. Id.
§ 1.167(a)-14(c)(4) (as amended in 2006).
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depending on the type of intellectual property acquired and the
manner of procurement: fifteen years for all acquired trade
secrets, trademarks, and trade names;94 fifteen years for
patents, copyrights, and computer software acquired with a
trade or business;95 five years for separately acquired musical
copyrights;96 and three years for separately acquired computer
software.97 A fixed recovery period is not prescribed for patents
and copyrights acquired separately. Instead, the capitalized
costs of these assets are recovered under one of two
approaches: (1) over their estimated useful lives under the
“straight-line method” or (2) as income is actually earned under
the “income-forecast method” (which has a maximum write-off
period of eleven years).98
The consequences of this approach raise policy concerns
regarding depreciation. For example, a patent acquired as part
of a business acquisition is subject to ratable fifteen-year
amortization (which may be shorter or longer than the actual
useful life of the patent), but a patent acquired separately
benefits from more rapid depreciation allowances (shorter
useful life under the straight-line method or accelerated
allowances under the income-forecast method).99 Is it logical
that all patents—regardless of type or remaining legal life—
acquired along with a business are grouped into a single
category with a single recovery method and period, while
patents acquired separately are depreciated using an asset-by94
95

I.R.C. §§ 197(a), (d)(1)(F) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(5) (as amended in 2008).
I.R.C. §§ 197(a), (d)(1)(C)(iii) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(5) (as amended in

2008).
96

I.R.C. § 167(g)(8)(A) (2006), amended by Tax Increase Prevention and
Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222 (providing that a taxpayer may elect to
ratably deduct the costs of acquiring any musical composition or any copyright with
respect to musical composition property over a five-year period instead of using the
income forecast method).
97
I.R.C. § 167(f).
98
For patents and copyrights acquired outside the context of a business
acquisition, tax depreciation rules that were applicable prior to 1993 generally
continue to apply. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-3(a) (as amended in 2004), -14(e) (as
amended in 2006). In 1997, Congress codified the income-forecast method of
depreciation in Section 167(g) of the Code, providing a maximum recovery period of
eleven years for income forecast property. I.R.C. § 167(g) (2006), amended by Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188; see also H.R. REP. NO. 105148, at 514, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 908. Forecasted total income includes all
income the taxpayer reasonably believes will be earned during the eleven-year period
beginning with the year the property is placed in service. I.R.C. §§ 167(g)(1)(A),
(g)(5)(C) (2006). In the eleventh year, a taxpayer may deduct any unrecovered costs left
in the property. Id. § 167(g)(1)(C).
99
See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
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asset approach? If patents derived their value from their
relationship to a product, service, or goodwill of a business, as
do trademarks or trade names, it might be justifiable to provide
an arbitrary recovery period to avoid messy valuation and
intangible asset allocation problems. However, the value of a
patent acquired as part of the purchase of a trade or business is
not necessarily tied to the goodwill of the acquired trade or
business.100 Rather, patents can be freely sold, assigned, or
transferred without associated goodwill or other business
assets.101 The same is true of copyrights and computer-software
(which is subject to different intellectual property
protections).102
As a result, the depreciation schedule for patents,
copyrights, and software need not necessarily parallel the
arbitrary depreciation schedule applicable to intangibles
acquired in a business acquisition, which lack inherent value
(such as trademarks and trade names). Indeed, an argument
could be made that, if two patents or two copyrights or two
types of computer software are capable of reasonable valuation,
and have relatively similar commercial lives, they should be
subject to similar tax rules no matter how acquired.103
100

Trademarks, in part, derive their value from goodwill. See 1 MCCARTHY,
supra note 31, §§ 2:18-19 (citing Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Menin, 115 F.2d 975 (2d Cir.
1940)). The value of patents, however, stems from the owner’s ability to “exclude others
from making, using, selling, or offering for sale the invention within the United States”
for a set number of years. 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.01 (2010).
101
35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) (“Applications for patent, patents, or any interest
therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing. The applicant, patentee,
or his assigns or legal representatives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive
right under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the
United States.”); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,
135-36 (1969) (citing Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891)) (“The law . . .
recognizes that [the patent holder] may assign to another his patent, in whole or in part,
and may license others to practice his invention.”).
102
A copyright can be transferred separately. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (stating
that “[t]he ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in party by any
means of conveyance or by operation of law” and that “[a]ny of the exclusive rights
comprised in a copyright . . . may be transferred . . . and owned separately”)
Trademarks, in contrast, are accompanied by the business goodwill they represent. See
Susan M. Richey, The Second Kind of Sin: Making the Case for a Duty to Disclose Facts
Related to Genericism and Functionality in the Trademark Office, 67 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 137, 167 n.146 (2010) (“The Lanham Act prohibits assignments in gross, requiring
that purchase of a trademark be accompanied by the business goodwill that it
represents, and, in the event that a transfer violates the rule, the assignment is void.”).
103
Tax inequities with respect to software purchases are even more evident in
light of the artificially short recovery period for separately acquired software. While
software acquired as part of the acquisition of a business is depreciated over fifteen
years, software acquired separately is depreciated over three years—a substantial tax
benefit to those taxpayers who can navigate the system and negotiate for separate
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Another example of tax inequity under depreciation
rules for intellectual property acquisitions relates to the
treatment of contingent payments. Contingent payments made
for patents and copyrights acquired with a business are treated
differently from contingent payments made for patents and
copyrights acquired separately. If a contingent payment is
made for a patent acquired with a business, the contingent
amount is written off over a fifteen-year period.104 If, on the
other hand, a contingent payment is made for a patent
acquired separately, the contingent amount is fully deductible
in the year paid.105 The apparent rationale behind permitting
this immediate deduction for separately acquired patents is
that each payment reflects the annual cost of the patent and
that a current deduction properly matches expenses with
income.106 However, the same policy can support current
deductions for all contingent payments, regardless of whether
the patent is acquired separately or with a trade or business.
Any concerns about valuing intangibles acquired in a business
acquisition or about allocating the purchase price among
acquired intangibles should be nonexistent when contingent
payments are involved.
purchases of software. Compare I.R.C. §§ 197(a)-(b), (e)(3) (2006) (providing fifteen-year
recovery period) with id. § 167(f)(1) (providing three-year recovery period).
104
Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(f)(2)(i) (as amended in 2008). According to the
legislative history:
[I]f a portion of the cost of acquiring an amortizable section 197 intangible is
contingent, the adjusted basis of the section 197 intangible is to be increased
as of the beginning of the month that the contingent amount is paid or
incurred. This additional amount is to be amortized ratably over the
remaining months in the . . . amortization period that applies to the
intangible as of the beginning of the month that the contingent amount is
paid or incurred.
H.R. REP. NO. 103-213, at 685 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1374.
105
Under this approach, known as the “variable contingent payment” method
of depreciation, a taxpayer adds the amount of the contingent payments to the basis of
the patent and then immediately takes a depreciation deduction for an equal amount.
The government has sanctioned the variable contingent payment method. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.167(a)-14(c)(4) (as amended in 2006); see also Associated Patentees, Inc. v.
Comm’r, 4 T.C. 979, 985-87 (1945), acq., 1959-2 C.B. 3 (sanctioning deduction for
variable contingent payments); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Comm’r, 34 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1218 (1975) (recognizing that deducting yearly payments on a patent is a
reasonable method of depreciation); Rev. Rul. 67-136, 1967-1 C.B. 58 (following the
Associated Patentees decision).
106
Associated Patentees, 4 T.C. at 986 (concluding that a current deduction for
the entire contingent payment gives the taxpayer “a reasonable, and not more than a
reasonable,” depreciation allowance, whereas permitting as depreciation only a
proportionate part of the payment “might deny petitioner the recovery of its cost and
would unquestionably result in a distortion of income”).
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Inequities in the Tax Treatment of Intellectual Property
Transfers

Like the tax treatment of acquisition costs, the tax
treatment of intellectual property transfers raises a number of
equity concerns. Consider the following example involving the
assignment of two patents. Individual A, a freelance inventor,
sells one of his many developed patents to a third party for
$100,000. XYZ, Inc., a small research company whose
employees conduct research, sells one of its many developed
patents to a third party for $100,000. Although one would
expect the tax system to treat Individual A and XYZ, Inc.
similarly, that is not the case. Individual A’s gain will be
treated as capital gain under the Code’s safe-harbor provision
in Section 1235;107 XYZ, Inc.’s gain, on the other hand, will be
treated as ordinary income under the Code’s general
provisions.108 Section 1235 requires that the transferor is a
statutorily defined “holder” of the patent—i.e., any individual
whose personal efforts created the patent property—to be
guaranteed capital-gains treatment.109 So, here, Individual A
can qualify for capital-gains treatment under Section 1235
even though the subject of the sale (i.e., the inventory being
sold) is not considered a capital asset under general
characterization principles.110 XYZ, Inc.’s assignment, however,
will not qualify for Section-1235 treatment, but will instead be
treated as a sale of a noncapital asset yielding ordinary
income.111

107

I.R.C. § 1235 (2006).
Id. §§ 1222 (requiring the sale or exchange of a “capital asset” for
preferential capital-gains treatment), 1221(a)(1) (excluding inventory from the capital
asset definition), 1231(b) (excluding inventory from the quasi-capital asset definition).
109
Id. §§ 1235(a), (b)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(d)(1)(i) (as amended in 1980).
More specifically, the regulations provide that a holder is any individual whose efforts
created the patented property and who would qualify as the “original and first”
inventor, or joint inventor, under the patent laws. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(d)(1)(i)
(referring to Title 35 of the U.S. Code). An inventor’s employer would not qualify as a
holder “even though he may be the equitable owner of the patent by virtue of an
employment relationship with the inventor.” S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 423 (1954)
(Comm. Rep.), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 50883.
110
I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1) (2006) (excluding from capital asset definition inventory
and inventory-like property).
111
Although corporations do not get lower rates on their capital gains, capital
gains can be used by a corporation to absorb capital losses the corporation may have.
See id. § 1211(a) (providing that a corporation’s capital losses are allowed only to the
extent of the corporation’s capital gains).
108
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Similar distinctions apply to copyright assignments. For
example, songwriters are subject to capital-gains tax rates on
the sales of their songs rather than higher personal income tax
rates as a result of a special Code provision enacted in 2006
governing musical compositions and the copyrights thereon.112
Peculiarly, capital-gains treatment is not available to other
individual artists, such as novelists, painters, sculptors, and
designers.113 Moreover, although individual copyright creators
have ordinary gain on the sale of their works (with the
exception of musical copyrights, as noted), corporate copyright
creators are eligible for capital gains on the sale of works
created by their employees and individual contractors.114 This
additional distinction results from the fact that the capitalasset exception for self-created property does not apply to nonindividual creators, such as corporations, whose employees or
independent contractors created the copyrights.115 These
distinctions lack any theoretical justification.
Current charitable deduction rules for intellectual
property donations also raise equity concerns. These deduction
rules favor income-generating intellectual property over nonincome-generating intellectual property.116 Moreover, they favor
donors that give income-generating intellectual property to
commercially-driven charities over donors that give similar
property to non-commercially-driven charities.117 Consider two
corporations planning to donate similar technologies with equal
values. ABC Company makes a donation to a large university
that will use the intellectual property in ways that directly
generate income. XYZ Company, however, makes its donation
to a small college that emphasizes education and basic
research. Prior to 2004, the Code granted both companies an
initial tax deduction for the same amount—the fair-market
112

Id. § 1221(b)(3).
Section 1221(b)(3) applies only to musical compositions and copyrights
thereon. Id. Individual artists, such as novelists, painters, sculptors, and designers are
subject to the general capital-gains provisions. See id. §§ 1221(a)(3) (excluding from
capital asset definition self-created copyrighted works), 1231(b)(1)(C) (excluding from
the definition of Section 1231 property self-created copyrighted works).
114
Id. §§ 1221-1222.
115
See Rev. Rul. 55-706, 1955-2 C.B. 300, superseded by Rev. Rul. 62-141,
1962-2 C.B. 181 (applying inventory exclusion, but not copyright exclusion, suggesting
that the copyright exclusion does not apply to works-for-hire creations); see also Desilu
Prods., Inc. v. Comm’r, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1695 (1965) (same).
116
For discussion of these charitable deduction rules, see infra notes 119-20
and accompanying text.
117
See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
113
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value of the donated property.118 As amended, the Code does not
grant either company a fair-market value deduction in the year
of the gift.119 The Code, however, does give ABC Company
future charitable tax deductions equal to a certain percentage
of the royalty income earned by its chosen donee, the
commercially driven university.120 Because the small college’s
utilization of XYZ Company’s donated intellectual property will
not directly generate income, XYZ receives no tax benefit for its
charitable giving. In practice, then, charitable deduction rules
favor intellectual property used in applied research over that
used for fundamental or purely scientific research, and favor
donors who give to donees with the physical facilities, financial
resources, and personnel capability to exploit intellectual
118

Since 1917, the government has provided a financial incentive for
taxpayers to transfer property to charities by giving taxpayers an immediate tax
deduction for their donations. See War Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50,
§ 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (allowing a charitable tax deduction for contributions by
individuals); Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, § 102(c), 49 Stat. 1014, 1016
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 170 (2006)) (allowing a charitable tax deduction for
contributions by corporations).
Historically, the amount of the taxpayer’s charitable contribution
deduction was the fair market value of the property contributed. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 58260, 1958-1 C.B. 126 (“The fair market value of an undivided present interest in a
patent, which is contributed by the owner of the patent to an organization described in
Section 170(c) . . . constitutes an allowable deduction as a charitable contribution, to
the extent provided in Section 170, in the taxable year in which such property was
contributed.”); H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 53 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645,
1699 (providing that taxpayer who contributed appreciated property to charity was
allowed deduction for fair market value of property); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c) (as
amended in 2008) (“If a charitable contribution is made in property other than money,
the amount of the contribution is the fair market value of the property at the time of
the contribution reduced as provided in section 170(e)(1) . . . .”). The government
defined “fair market value” as “the price at which the property would change hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to
buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.” Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-1(c)(2) (as amended in 2008). The government, however, never fully
articulated or formalized a standard or approach for determining the fair market value
of donated intellectual property.
119
In 2004, in a drastic and hasty move, Congress amended the charitable
deduction provision by eliminating the fair market value standard for contributions of
most all forms of intellectual property, reducing the initial amount a donor may deduct.
See I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(iii) (2006), amended by American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418. The 2004 legislation limits the initial charitable
deduction of any type of intellectual property to the property’s tax basis. Often, the
donor’s tax basis in intellectual property is very small; in many cases, the donor’s basis
is zero because developments costs are often deducted when incurred.
120
To encourage charitable giving of intellectual property, Congress deemed it
appropriate to grant donors of intellectual property future charitable deductions based on
the income received by the donee charity. I.R.C. § 170(m)(3) (2006). Specifically, the donor
can take a deduction for up to ten years for gifts of royalty-producing intellectual property
to public charities. The amount of the charitable deduction is a percentage of the royalty
income earned by the donee. The percentage declines over time. Id. §§ 170(m)(1), (7).
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property solely for direct financial results—a result that
violates notions of fairness.121
In sum, numerous tax inequities exist for intellectual
property developers, acquirers, and transferors. Many of these
inequities encourage taxpayers to plan transactions that
minimize taxes. If a taxpayer identifies a business’s patent that
it would like to purchase for contingent payments, the taxpayer
receives greater immediate tax deductions if it can negotiate
the purchase of the patent separately from the seller’s other
business assets.122 A taxpayer planning to donate incomegenerating intellectual property to a charity will receive larger
tax deductions if it donates the property to a donee that can
use the intellectual property in ways that will directly generate
income, rather than a non-commercially-driven donee.123 These
decisions should be tax-neutral. But under the present tax
regime, they are not.124
III.

EXPLORING EFFICIENCY IN THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM

In addition to fairness concerns, an income tax system
governing intellectual property should embrace the principle of
efficiency.125 In tax theory, efficiency means various things in
various contexts.126 A tax system can be evaluated in terms of
the extent to which it promotes or hinders economic growth; it
is efficient when it promotes economic growth and inefficient
when it stifles beneficial economic behavior.127 In addition to
promoting economic efficiency, a tax system can also be judged
in terms of administrative efficiency—namely, the extent to
which it minimizes taxpayer compliance and government
enforcement costs.128 Thus, the current intellectual property
121

See generally Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Giving Intellectual
Property, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1721 (2006).
122
As previously noted, the treatment of contingent payments for patents
acquired separately (current deduction) is more generous than the treatment of
contingent payments for patents that are acquired with a trade or business (deferral
and amortization over fifteen years). See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
123
Charitable tax deductions (beginning with the donation year) equal a
percentage of income generated by the donated intellectual property. See supra note 120.
124
See supra notes 104-06, 116-21 and accompanying text.
125
See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
126
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
127
See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
128
See Edward Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55
FORDHAM L. REV. 395 (1987); Yorio, supra note 18, at 1256-57.

28

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1

taxation system should be analyzed in terms of both economic
and administrative efficiency. The current taxation policies
applicable to the development and transfer of new technology
provide an excellent example of the inefficiencies in the
existing regime.
A.

Limits of Current Incentives for Technology Development

The Internal Revenue Code contains certain provisions
designed to promote economic growth and improve the
competiveness of U.S. businesses by encouraging research and
development.129 These provisions provide a tax deduction and a
tax credit for certain technology development costs.130 They are
also intended to reduce uncertainty and complexity
encountered when applying general tax rules to intellectual
property transactions. In practice, however, these tax
incentives have been an inadequate method of realizing their
underlying goals.
Section 174131 provides a deduction for research
expenditures.132 Since this deduction applies only to inventors
who use, or intend to use, their research results in a trade or
129

For a discussion and critique of these Code provisions, see infra notes 13147 and accompanying text.
130
Section 174 was enacted to encourage research activity and stimulate
economic growth and technological development. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337 (1954),
reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4053; 100 CONG. REC. 3425 (1954) (statement of
Chairman Reed: “This provision will greatly stimulate the search for new products and
new inventions upon which the future economics and military strength of our Nation
depends. It will be particularly valuable to small and growing businesses.”); see also
Donald C. Alexander, Research and Experimental Expenditures Under the 1954 Code,
10 TAX L. REV. 549 (1955) (noting that a primary reason for enacting Section 174 was
to create an incentive for new products and inventions through federal subsidy of
research and development startups); William Natbony, The Tax Incentives for Research
and Development: An Analysis and a Proposal, 76 GEO. L.J. 347, 349 (1987) (explaining
that Congress decided “to provide taxpayers with the option of an immediate
deduction” in order “to encourage new [research and development]”); Richard L.
Parker, The Innocent Civilians in the War Against NOL Trafficking: Section 382 and
High-Tech Start-Up Companies, 9 VA. TAX REV. 625, 694 (1990) (“The deduction
election under section 174(a) is intended to encourage research and development
activities by allowing the cost of such activities to be used to offset the income earned
in the business at the earliest possible date.”).
Section 41 was enacted to encourage firms to increase their research
expenditures over time. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 221(a), 95 Stat. 172, 241 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 41 (2006)). The credit is
incremental in that it is equal to a certain percentage of qualified research spending
above a base amount, id., which can be thought of as a firm’s normal level of research
and development investment.
131
I.R.C. § 174 (2006).
132
Id.
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business,133 it probably does not cover the inventor who merely
intends to license the results of her inventive activities for
taxable income.134 In today’s innovation marketplace, however,
very few individual inventors, startup companies, and young
research entities develop their innovations into end products or
services for commercial exploitation.135 Instead, most plan to
sell or license their innovations to larger companies looking to
acquire innovations to supplement their own research or build
promising intellectual property portfolios.136 To achieve optimal
research outcomes and their concomitant economic benefits,
then, tax law should recognize and adequately incentivize
efforts by individual inventors, startups, and the like—
regardless of whether their motives are to use research results
in a trade or business, or simply to license research results.
Parallel to Section 174’s research deduction, the Code
provides a 20% research credit under Section 41.137 The Section
41 credit, like the deduction, is inadequate. The credit applies
only to qualified research expenditures in excess of a base
amount that is a “fixed-base percentage” of the taxpayer’s
“average annual gross receipts” for the four preceding tax
years.138 For established firms, the fixed-base percentage is the
ratio of the taxpayer’s qualified research expenses to its gross
receipts for years 1984 to 1988, capped at 16%.139 For startup
firms, the fixed-base percentage is set at 3% during the firm’s
first five tax years, with spending on qualified research and
gross receipts; thereafter, the percentage is gradually adjusted
to reflect the firm’s actual experience, so that by its eleventh
133

See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
A few courts, however, have found a trade or business of inventing and
permitted deductions. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
135
Reasons for not fully developing innovations may include cost, expertise,
facility restrictions, business environment, and personnel concerns. See, e.g., Jonathan
Thaw, Writely Puts Google in Word-Processing Business, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER
(Mar. 10, 2006), http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/262443_googlewritely10.html
(reporting the acquisition of a software startup company by Google).
136
If an inventor cannot self-develop certain innovations, it looks to others to
acquire the innovations. Generally, companies acquire innovations for purposes of
further development and production of products and services with the desire to expand
or to capture additional market shares. See, e.g., Ben Elgin, Google Buys Android for
Its Mobile Arsenal, BUS. WK. (Aug. 17, 2005), http://www.businessweek.com/
technology/content/aug2005/tc20050817_0949_tc024.htm (stating that Google acquired
the twenty-two-month-old startup for its “talented engineers and great technology”
with “tremendous potential in developing smarter mobile devices that are more aware
of its owner’s location and preferences”).
137
I.R.C. § 41 (2006).
138
Id. §§ 41(a), (c)(1).
139
Id. §§ 41(c)(3)(A), (C).
134
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year, the percentage equals the firm’s total qualified research
expenses relative to its total receipts for the fifth through tenth
tax years.140 The base amount may not be less than 50% of the
qualified research expenses for the credit year.141
Although Section 41 was designed to encourage
additional private sector investment in research and
development,142 as structured, the Section 41 credit fails to
achieve optimal technology results for a number of reasons.
First, the credit’s reformulation over the years has limited the
types of research for which the credit is available. Indeed, not
all expenditures that qualify for the research deduction under
Section 174 qualify for the research credit under Section 41,
due to the latter’s special requirements and exceptions. For
example, to meet the definitional requirements of “qualified
research,” substantially all research activities must constitute
elements of a “process of experimentation” related to a
qualified purpose.143 The “process of experimentation”
requirement narrows the definition of the term “qualified
research”; indeed, the requirements for a process of
experimentation under Section 41 continue to be more
stringent than the requirements for research and development
in the experimental or laboratory sense under Section 174.144

140

Id. § 41(c)(3)(B). For illustrations of the credit computation, see GARY
GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SER., RL31181, RESEARCH TAX CREDIT: CURRENT STATUS
AND SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 6-17 (2008).
141
I.R.C. § 41(c)(2). Taxpayers may, at their election, compute the research
credit under another method—the alternative simplified credit method. Tax Relief and
Health Care Act of 2006 § 104, I.R.C. § 41(c)(5) (2006). The alternative simplified credit
method is an amount equal to 14 percent of the amount by which “the qualified
research expenses . . . exceed[] 50 percent of the average qualified research expenses
for the [three preceding] taxable years . . . .” I.R.C. § 41(c)(5)(A) (2006). For taxpayers
with no qualified research expenses for the three preceding years, the amount of the
alternative simplified credit is “equal to 6 percent of the qualified research expenses for
the [current] taxable year.” Id. § 41(c)(5)(B).
142
Studies have shown that the credit has led to increased research spending.
See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
(2007); GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-89-114, THE RESEARCH TAX CREDIT HAS
STIMULATED SOME ADDITIONAL RESEARCH SPENDING (1989).
143
I.R.C. § 41(d)(1) (2006).
144
See 69 Fed. Reg. 22, 24 (Jan. 2, 2004) (“[M]erely demonstrating that
uncertainty has been eliminated . . . is insufficient to satisfy the process of
experimentation requirement. A taxpayer bears the burden of demonstrating that its
research activities additionally satisfy the process of experimentation requirement.”); see
also Treas. Reg. § 1.41-4(a)(5)(i) (as amended in 2004) (“[A] process of experimentation is
a process designed to evaluate one or more alternatives to achieve a result where the
capability or the method of achieving that result, or the appropriate design of that result,
is uncertain as of the beginning of the taxpayer’s research activities.”).
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Second, the incremental nature of the credit means that
many businesses cannot utilize it at all. This could be the case,
for example, if a company’s gross sales grew faster than its
qualified research spending. Calculating today’s credit based
on research spending relative to receipts in the years 1984 to
1988 does not reflect realities of today’s economic and
technological world, and it could penalize a company that had
high research spending levels during the 1984 to 1988 base
period (unless the alternative formula provided a benefit).145
Third, the nonpermanent nature of the credit makes it
difficult for firms to plan ahead for research activities. The
credit is only temporary and has been extended numerous
times by Congress. In fact, since its enactment in 1981, the
credit has been extended more than a dozen times, sometimes
retroactively after expiration.146 Efforts to make the credit
permanent have failed due to revenue concerns.147 So, every
credit renewal year, the government must balance its desire to
maximize tax revenue without stifling beneficial research and
development activity.
B.

Limits of Current Incentives for Technology Transfers

Under the current system, tax incentives for research
are limited to the innovation-development market.148 In recent
years, however, there has been a major shift in the innovationdevelopment market toward a segmentation model. Small
companies and research universities now serve as epicenters of
ideas, complementing and maximizing the innovations of large
established firms with strong marketing and distribution
forces.149 The desirable transfers of innovation between
segments can be either supported or hindered by the income

145

See supra note 141 (describing the alternative simplified credit method).
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 41(h)(1)(B) (2006).
147
A one-year extension of the credit, for example, was estimated to cost the
government almost $9 billion over ten years. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH
CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF H.R. 6049, at 4 (Comm. Print 2008), available
at http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=1293.
148
See I.R.C. §§ 41 (providing limited tax credit for qualified research
expenses), 174 (providing current tax deduction for research and experimental
expenditures), 1235 (guaranteeing preferential capital-gains rate treatment for certain
inventors).
149
See generally Michael J. Kennedy, Technology and Emerging Growth
Acquisitions: The Private Perspective, in HANDLING HIGH-TECH M&AS IN A COOLING
MARKET: ENSURING THAT YOU GET VALUE 921, 923-25 (Practising Law Institute, 2001)
(discussing the flexibility associated with deals between private and public companies).
146
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tax system. Favorable tax rules governing assignments to
private market acquirers and donations to public charities
could serve to encourage transfers to the right acquirers for
further research, product development, or licensing—thereby
increasing economic growth.150 Here, again, the tax rules could
also facilitate administrative efficiency by removing
unnecessary complexity in their application. This type of tax
scheme would support the business and technology realities of
today’s innovation segmentation, allow new ideas to develop at
a faster pace, and foster strong competition. The current tax
system, however, is not designed as such. Currently, there are
inefficiencies in the tax scheme covering both private market
transactions and charitable donations of technology.
1. Private-Market Transactions
With respect to private-market transactions, the income
tax system could be used to create incentives for transferors or
transferees—or both. Presently, few transferors are guaranteed
preferential capital-gains treatment on the assignment of their
inventions.151 Section 1235 of the Code guarantees capital-gains
treatment only to individuals—i.e., the original inventors that
assign all substantial rights to their inventions;152 it does not
apply to the more common startup companies and small
research entities whose employees conduct their research.153 As
a result, these developers must apply general tax rules to
determine the character of their gains, and these gains are
often characterized as ordinary income, especially if the firm
has sold a number of inventions over the years.154
150

For an argument that greater tax incentives for purchasers of intellectual
property may encourage desirable transfers of intellectual property, see infra notes
155-78 and accompanying text. For an argument that revised charitable deduction
rules may encourage desirable donations of intellectual property, see infra notes 179-84
and accompanying text.
151
See I.R.C. § 1235 (2006).
152
Section 1235 guarantees capital-gains rates, as opposed to higher ordinary
income tax rates, for any transfer of all substantial rights to a patent by certain holders
to unrelated parties. Id. § 1235(a). “[A]ny individual whose efforts created such
property” qualifies as a “holder” for purposes of Section 1235. Id. § 1235(b)(1).
153
Although Section 1235 does not apply to companies, “each member of a
partnership who is an individual[, however,] may qualify as a holder as to his [prorata] share of a patent owned by the partnership.” Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(d)(2) (as
amended in 1980).
154
I.R.C. §§ 1221(a)(1), 1231(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2006) (precluding inventory and
inventory-type property from qualifying for capital-gains treatment). Although
corporations do not enjoy lower rates on capital gains, capital gains can be used to
offset capital losses the corporation may have. Id. § 1211(a) (“In the case of a
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Likewise, transferees of high technology receive few
breaks for their acquisition costs under the current regime.
Without exception, purchasers of technology are subject to the
general asset-capitalization rule, which requires them to
capitalize all costs of acquiring technology.155 This rule, of
course, raises the costs of products that have a high technology
content. To remedy this effect, the government could depart
from the asset-capitalization principle and instead allow
limited expensing of innovation purchase costs. Although the
government has never considered doing so, it has, since 1981,
permitted small business taxpayers to elect to immediately
deduct the cost of purchasing certain tangible property that
would otherwise have to be capitalized (e.g., business machines
and
equipment,
transportation
equipment,
and
156
communications equipment). The extension of this expense
allowance to certain innovation acquisition costs would
represent a significant tax subsidy for innovation investment
and achieve other important goals. Chiefly, it would lower the
cost of capital for innovations used in an active trade or
business, which, in turn, would reduce the tax burden on
innovation acquirers, and stimulate business investment and
the economy as a whole. Policymakers had these goals in mind
when they enacted special expensing provisions for tangible
property.157 These objectives are equally applicable to intangible
innovations.
Moreover, expanding the expense allowance for limited
acquisition costs would eliminate high administrative costs and
reduce the harm caused by current irrational tax depreciation
rules. Some commentators have argued that the capitalization
of costs is warranted only if followed by rational depreciation

corporation, losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only to the
extent of gains from such sales or exchanges.”).
155
Id. § 263 (2006); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(i), -4(c) (2004) (“[A]
taxpayer must capitalize amounts paid to another party to acquire any intangible from
that party in a purchase or similar transaction.”).
156
I.R.C. § 179 (2006). The type of property to which the election applies is
“section 179 property,” defined generally as tangible, depreciable, personal property—
as opposed to real property—that is acquired for use in the active conduct of a trade or
business. Id. § 179(d)(1). As a result of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and
Reconciliation Act of 2003 § 202(c), Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752, off-the-shelf
computer software was added to the list of Section 179 property.
157
See GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31852, SMALL BUSINESS
EXPENSING ALLOWANCE: CURRENT STATUS, LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, AND ECONOMIC
EFFECTS 3-5 (2005) (weighing the costs and benefits of expensing for small businesses).
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rules.158 But the current system is far from rational, supporting
the argument that capitalization is not necessarily justified for
all intellectual property acquisition costs. As the authors have
argued elsewhere, any immediate incentive for acquisition
costs, such as the expensing option discussed here, should be
limited to innovations acquired for future development or
licensing.159 This incentive should not extend to innovations
acquired for offensive-use purposes because the use of patent
portfolios to threaten others through litigation actually
hinders, rather than promotes, innovation.160
As an alternative to allowing an expense option for
certain innovation acquisitions, the government could design
more rational tax depreciation rules that would incentivize
desirable innovation acquisitions. When designing new ex ante
depreciation rules, a decision would have to be made about
whether to establish a grouping system for innovations (the
current approach for all tangible property161 and intangible
property acquired with a business162) or an asset-by-asset
system (the current approach for intangible property acquired
separately)163. A grouping system would achieve greater
administrative efficiency than an asset-by-asset depreciation
system and, if designed properly, could also support a strong
acquisition market. Under a grouping system, intellectual
property could be grouped into classes with arbitrary recovery
periods for each class. This approach would alleviate some of
the problems caused by both the asset-by-asset approach—
namely, the burden of having to determine the useful life of
separately acquired intellectual property—and the incomeforecast method.
In selecting an appropriate recovery period for various
classes of intellectual property, the government could make an
effort to achieve some correlation between the prescribed
groupings and the actual economic useful lives of intellectual
158

See Ethan Yale, When Are Capitalization Exceptions Justified?, 57 TAX L.
REV. 549, 557-64 (2004) (arguing that flawed depreciation schedules may justify
departure from normative capitalization but only in limited cases; otherwise, expensing
may be a preferable neutrality-enhancing policy choice).
159
Nguyen & Maine, Acquiring Innovation, supra note 4, at 787-92.
160
Id.
161
I.R.C. § 168(b) (2006) (listing various depreciation methods according to
type of property).
162
Id. § 197; see supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
163
I.R.C. § 167; Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 2004), -14 (as
amended in 2006); see supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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property. The correlation between tax depreciation and
economic depreciation would not have to be exact. Indeed, the
government could design a system that is “accelerated”; many
of the recovery periods for intellectual property could be
shorter for tax purposes than for economic purposes. Under an
accelerated approach, purchasers of intellectual property could
recover their costs more quickly tax-wise than economic reality
would dictate.
It might be tempting to adhere to a fifteen-year recovery
period—the recovery period for many intangible assets under
the current scheme (which determines the applicable recovery
period based on how the intellectual property was acquired).164
For many intangibles acquired in a business acquisition, the
recovery period is fifteen years. By contrast, an asset-specific
approach is used for separately acquired intangibles.165
Although fifteen years is a short period compared to the
unlimited lives of trade secrets, trademarks, and trade names,
it is much longer than the useful lives of many acquired
patents. The government selected a fifteen-year recovery period
so that the new legislation would be approximately revenueneutral over the first five years.166 While much can be said for
this current revenue-neutral approach, it is not an ideal
method of encouraging desirable innovation acquisitions.
The government should consider creating exemptions
from the current fifteen-year period for patents, patent
applications, software, and other high technology intellectual
property purchased in the acquisition of a trade or business.
Property of this nature is capable of reasonable valuation and
has a relatively short commercial life, no matter how it was
acquired. If technology derived its value from its relationship to
a product, service, or goodwill of a business (as a trademark or
trade names does), it might make sense to provide an arbitrary
fifteen-year recovery period to avoid messy valuation and
intangible asset-allocation problems. However, high technology
acquired as part of the purchase of a company does not
164

See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
166
See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION OF TAX SIMPLIFICATION ACT OF 1993, at 147 (Comm. Print 1993)
[hereinafter TECHNICAL EXPLANATION], available at http://www.jct.gov/publications.
html?func=startdown&id=2915 (acknowledging that the asset’s useful life may either
fall short or exceed the amortization period, but nevertheless establishing such
amortization period based on the goal of revenue neutrality over the subsequent five
fiscal years).
165
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necessarily derive its value from the goodwill and reputation of
the business with which it is associated. High technology can
be freely sold, assigned, or transferred without associated
goodwill or other business assets.167 Hence, the depreciation
schedule for technology need not parallel the arbitrary fifteenyear schedule application to all intangibles acquired in a
business acquisition, such as trademarks and trade names,
which lack inherent value.
With
regard
to
technology—whether
acquired
separately or with a business—short recovery periods, such as
three or five years, would incentivize investment in innovation
capital. Short recovery periods would also recognize the
relatively risky nature of high technology compared to other
intangible assets. Risk, such as retirement risk and revenue
risk, “can have a significant impact on the optimal design of
depreciation rules.”168 As some economists have argued,
“depreciation schedules for relatively risky assets should be
accelerated to compensate the owners of such assets for bearing
a disproportionably large share of the capital price risk.”169 It is
often difficult to determine whether certain acquired
technologies will produce benefits and, if they do, how long
benefits will last. For example, if a purchaser acquires
technology at an early stage while patent applications for the
technology are pending, the purchaser cannot be certain that
all of the patent applications will mature to patents. In
addition, even after the purchaser receives the patents, there is
always a fear that the patents may be subsequently invalidated
by a third party.170
The government has already provided an artificially low
recovery period for separately acquired computer software. In
167

See supra notes 101-02.
Jeff Strnad, Tax Depreciation and Risk, 52 SMU L. REV. 547, 547 (1999);
see also id. at 547-48 (“[R]etirement risk must be taken into account in designing an
accelerated schedule that does not favor some assets over others.”).
169
Yale, supra note 158, at 572 (citing Jeremy I. Bulow & Lawrence H.
Summers, The Taxation of Risky Assets, 92 J. POL. ECON. 20, 37-38 (1984); Roger H.
Gordon & John Douglas Wilson, Measuring the Efficiency Cost of Taxing Risky Capital
Income, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 427, 438 (1989)).
170
See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. . . . The
burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party
asserting such invalidity.”); Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that the presumption of validity must be overcome by clear
and convincing evidence); William Alsup, A District Judge’s Proposal for Patent Reform:
Revisiting the Clear and Convincing Standard and Calibrating Deference to the Strength
of the Examination, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1647, 1648 (2009) (“[A]t least one-third of
patent claims asserted in litigation should never have issued.”).
168
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1993, Congress created an arbitrary three-year depreciation
period for capitalized costs of separately acquired software (i.e.,
software that is not acquired as part of the purchase of a trade
or business).171 This recovery period reduces the cost of, and
encourages investment in, computer software, allowing U.S.
firms to compete in the world marketplace. The government
could extend the three-year recovery period for computer
software to similar high technology intellectual property, for
example, advanced formulae, processes, or design patterns.172
Admittedly, short write-off periods, such as those
proposed here, run counter to the basic goal of tax
depreciation—i.e., to measure the decline in the value of
property due to wear, tear, and obsolescence, and to match the
cost recovery of the property with the income stream produced
by the property.173 But this matching goal is difficult to achieve
and, in recent years, has given way to the desire for tax
simplification and economic growth.174 In the 1980s, Congress
created artificially low recovery periods for depreciable tangible
property (three, five, and seven years in most cases).175 And
recently, courts have permitted rapid write offs of antique
tangible property used in a trade or business, even though
antiques do not have a determinable useful life and usually
increase in value.176 In 1993, Congress created a fifteen-year
recovery period for many intangibles, some of which have
unlimited lives and were before then considered ineligible for
depreciation allowances.177 These rules increase tax revenue
loss for the government, but the resulting losses are considered
outweighed by the benefits of lower efficiency costs and the

171

See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
Tax Treatment of Intangible Assets: Hearing on S. 1245, H.R. 3035 & H.R.
4210 Before the Comm. on Fin., 102d Cong. 160-61 (1992) (statement of the Elec. Indus.
Ass’n) (arguing a shorter recovery period is warranted for high technology intellectual
property since such property is very similar to computer software).
173
1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 908.
174
The tax expensing and tax depreciation rules for tangible property are
prime examples. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 168 (2006) (providing arbitrarily short recovery
periods for most depreciable tangible personal property); id. § 179 (providing limited
expensing of the cost of purchasing depreciable tangible personal property).
175
Id. §§ 168(c), (e).
176
See, e.g., Simon v. Comm’r, 68 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (allowing tax
depreciation for antique violin bows even though the taxpayers could not demonstrate
that the bows had a determinable useful life).
177
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13261, 107 Stat.
312 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 197 (2006)); see supra notes 94-95 and
accompanying text.
172
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potential competitive advantages to be gained by U.S.
businesses.178
2. Public Charitable Transfers
In the current innovation development segmentation
market,
many
universities
and
other
not-for-profit
organizations engage in valuable research activities. An
efficient tax system should encourage transfers of undeveloped
innovation to such charitable donees. Historically, the
charitable tax deduction was a vital tool for transferring
technology from research corporations to universities and other
nonprofit donees that could properly exploit the technology.179
As a result of 2004 legislation aimed at reducing the
number of negligent and intentional overvaluations of
intellectual property donations, there is now very little
immediate economic incentive for charitable donations of any
type of intellectual property.180 Presently, few technology donors
receive any immediate tax benefit for their contributions.181
Donors can take future deductions if the donated intellectual
property generates income for the charitable donee.182 But
providing donors with uncertain and declining future economic
incentives does not adequately encourage intellectual property
donations. Even if a charitable donee licenses the donated
178

For early arguments for and against depreciation deductions for
trademarks and trade names, see Michael J. Dunne & Elizabeth A. Barba, The Tax
Treatment of Trademarks Gets Renewed Attention in Congress, NAT’L L.J., May 11,
1992, at S15.
179
Large corporations with research and development facilities often develop
patents that later become “not consistent with [their] core technologies or mission,” that
are “not appropriate for licensing to third parties,” or that have “no value for defensive
purposes in competitive markets.” RON LAYTON & PETER BLOCK, INT’L INTELLECTUAL
PROP. INST., IP DONATIONS: A POLICY REVIEW 5 (2004), available at http://s251835929.
onlinehome.us/reports/IP_Donations_Policy_Review.pdf. For example, Dow Chemical
reportedly donated 10,000 patents to qualified charitable organizations over a five-year
period. Id. at 6.
180
See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
181
Presently, the initial charitable deduction amount is the lesser of the
taxpayer’s tax basis in the donated intellectual property or the fair market value of the
intellectual property at the time of contribution. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B) (2006). In most
cases, where intellectual property appreciates in value, the lesser amount is the donor’s
tax basis. Often the donor’s tax basis in intellectual property is very small; in many
cases, the donor’s basis is zero because intellectual property development costs are
often deducted when incurred. See, e.g., id. § 174.
182
More specifically, a donor is allowed deductions for a limited number of
years based on a specified percentage of the qualified donee income “received by or
accrued to” the charity from the donated property itself, rather than income stemming
from the activity in which the donated property is used. Id. § 170(m).
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intellectual property, the potential future deduction will not be
substantial enough. It may take the charity several years
before it receives any financial return on its donated
intellectual property. While the intellectual property may begin
generating royalty revenues immediately, under the new law,
the amount of future charitable deductions declines annually
on a sliding scale.183 Indeed, in the tenth post-contribution year,
the donor may deduct only 20% of the income.184
C.

Administrative Inefficiencies Under Current Intellectual
Property Tax Regime

In addition to promoting economic efficiency, the
general rule is that a good tax system should also be
administratively efficient; it should provide certainty and
clarity to minimize costs of compliance and administration.
Many of the special rules governing intellectual property were
enacted to reduce uncertainty and complexity encountered
when applying general tax rules to intellectual property
transactions. For example, Section 174 reduced uncertainties
in the application of the asset-capitalization rule to research
and development expenditures.185 Likewise, Section 1235
clarified the tax treatment of patent transfers,186 and Section
183

Id. §§ 170(m)(1), (7).
Id. § 170(m)(7).
185
While one justification for Section 174 was to encourage new research and
development activity and stimulate economic growth and technological development,
another justification was “to reduce uncertainty caused by the application of the assetcapitalization rules to” research and development activities. George Mundstock,
Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1179, 1258-59 (1987); see
also David S. Hudson, The Tax Concept of Research or Experimentation, 45 TAX LAW.
85, 88-89 (1991) (explaining that the old capitalization rule was difficult to apply to
research and development costs).
186
While Section 1235 was intended to encourage research and development
that potentially lead to patentable inventions, it also resulted in reduced uncertainty
and minimized disputes over the application of general tax principles to patent
transfers. For example, when applicable, Section 1235 provides statutory assurance
that a patent transfer will not be deemed a license merely because of the existence of
contingent payments. I.R.C. § 1235(a) (2006) (providing that Section 1235 applies
regardless of whether the payments received are “(1) payable periodically over a period
generally coterminous with the transferee’s use of the patent, or (2) contingent on the
productivity, use, or disposition of the property transferred”); see also S. REP. NO. 831622, at 422 (1954) (Comm. Rep.), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5082 (stating
that Section 1235 was intended “to give statutory assurance to certain patent holders
that the sale of a patent (whether as an ‘assignment’ or ‘exclusive license’) shall not be
deemed not to constitute a ‘sale or exchange’ for tax purposes solely on account of the
mode of payment”).
Section 1235 also eliminates uncertainty over whether a patent transferor
is an amateur (who is eligible for capital-gains treatment under general tax principles)
184
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1253 alleviated uncertainties and much litigation regarding the
tax treatment of trademark and trade name transfers.187
Section 197, similarly, was enacted “to simplify the rules for
depreciating intangibles and to reduce the number of
controversies arising from the need to determine which
intangibles are depreciable and what their recovery periods
should be.”188
The problem is that few of the special tax rules are
conclusive; they contain many limitations, ambiguities, and
exceptions. The consequence is that the tax outcome for many
intellectual property assets and transactions is determined
under the general tax rules—the same rules that were the
initial source of complexity. For example, if Section 174 does
or a professional inventor (who is not eligible for capital-gains treatment under general
tax principles). H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 85 (1954) (Comm. Rep.), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4108; S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 112 (1954) (Comm. Rep.), reprinted in
1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4747.
Section 1235 also eliminates the need to ascertain the holding period of an
invention for purposes of meeting the requisite one-year holding period under the general
capital-gains provisions. I.R.C. § 1222(3) (2006) (“‘[L]ong-term capital gain’ means gain
from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 1 year . . . .”).
If the requirements of Section 1235 are met (i.e., there exists a transfer of
“all substantial rights” by a “holder” to an “unrelated party,” as those terms are defined
for purposes of section 1235), then a patent transferor is assured capital-gains
treatment. Id. § 1235(a). Determinations of what constitutes a “sale” or a “capital
asset” are made under general sale or exchange principles. See id. §§ 1221, 1222, 1231
(general capital-gains provisions).
187
Prior to the enactment of Section 1253 in 1969, there was confusion over
the proper tax consequences of trademark and trade name dispositions. In particular,
there was considerable diversity of opinion among courts over what sorts of interests
retained by transferors should preclude capital-gains treatment and uncertainty over
the impact of contingent payments in trademark and trade-name transfers. Congress
enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1969 § 516, I.R.C. § 1235 (2006), to bring clarity to this
area of the law. See S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 198 (1969) (Comm. Rep.), reprinted in 1969
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2242-43; H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 1815-16 (1964) (Comm. Rep.),
reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1815-16.
Section 1253 mandates ordinary income treatment on all payments that are
“contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition” of a trademark or trade name. I.R.C.
§ 1253(c) (2006) (emphasis added). Section 1253 imposes ordinary income treatment on
noncontingent payments (whether up-front or installment payments) received for the
transfer of a trademark or trade name “if the transferor retains any significant power,
right, or continuing interest with respect to the subject matter” of the mark or name. Id.
§ 1253(a). The Code sets forth six potentially significant powers, any one of which, if
retained, would require ordinary income treatment. Id. § 1253(b)(2). This list of retained
powers is not exhaustive; rather, consideration is given to all the facts and circumstances
existing at the time of a transfer to determine whether an unenumerated power
constitutes a significant power. For example, the duration of the relevant restriction is
important in determining whether the restriction is significant. Stokely USA, Inc. v.
Comm’r, 100 T.C. 439, 453, 456-57 (1993) (finding that a five-year right to disapprove a
transfer was insignificant, while a twenty-year restriction preventing the transferee from
using the trademark on certain products was significant).
188
Mary LaFrance, Days of Our Lives: The Impact of Section 197 on the Depreciation
of Copyrights, Patents, and Related Property, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 317, 320 (1995).
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not apply, a taxpayer must capitalize the research costs.189
However, complex questions arise in applying the assetcapitalization principle to research costs. For example, when do
research activities result in an identifiable asset? How does one
apportion the costs if a particular project partly succeeds and
partly fails, or if different and simultaneous research activities
contribute in varying degrees to the development of an asset or
more than one asset?
Similarly, if Section 1235 does not apply to patent
assignments, the general sale or exchange principle must be
applied to determine the tax treatment of a particular
transfer.190 But difficult-to-answer questions with respect to
technology—questions that justified adoption of the special
rule—must be addressed: Does the transfer constitute a sale?
Is the subject of transfer a capital asset? What is the holding
period?
Likewise, if Section 197 does not apply to an intellectual
property acquisition, tax depreciation allowances are
determined under the asset-specific approach that applied
before enactment of the special provision—under the straightline or income-forecast method.191 This approach sets up
unnecessary rule, compliance, and transactional complexity—
raising the question of why there are different depreciation
methods and different write-off periods for the same type of
technology that depend solely on the method of technology
transfer.192
The new charitable deduction rules applicable to
technology contributions are a classic example of a recent tax
law change that was designed to enhance administrative
efficiency but only increased inefficiency. The new law’s focus
on future tax deductions imposes heavy administrative
189

The Section 174 deduction is an exception to the general assetcapitalization principle of Section 263. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1)(B) (2006). If Section 174 does
not apply, the research and development costs must be capitalized. See id.
190
Section 1235 is a safe-harbor provision providing all the elements
necessary for capital-gains treatment. Id. § 1235(a) (providing that a transfer “shall be
considered the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 1 year”). If Section
1235 does not apply (e.g., the transfer does not consist of all substantial rights to a
patent by a holder), the general capital-gains provisions apply (i.e., capital-gains
treatment is only available if the transfer constitutes a “sale or exchange of a capital
asset”). See id.
191
When applicable, Section 197 is used to determine cost recovery
deductions. Id. § 197(b). When inapplicable, general depreciation principles apply.
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-14 (as amended in 2006).
192
Tax Treatment of Intangible Assets: Hearing on S. 1245, H.R. 3035 & H.R. 4210
Before the Comm. on Fin., 102d Cong. 52 (1992) (statement of William P. Benac).
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burdens, including modified and expanded record-keeping
requirements, on both intellectual property donors and
charitable donees.193 Because the new law allows donors to take
deductions over a period of years determined based upon the
income derived from the donated property, the donor and the
donee organization must communicate with one another and
with the IRS for several years following a qualified
contribution.194 By allowing future deductions to be based on
income received or accrued by the charity from the donated
property itself, rather than from income stemming from the
activity in which the donated property is used, the new law
places the difficult burden on charities of tracking their specific
intellectual property assets. Moreover, with regard to
considering future tax deductions at stake under the new law,
donors will incur substantial monitoring costs.
IV.

DEVELOPING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY TAXATION

From an equity and efficiency standpoint, there are
fundamental flaws in the current intellectual property tax
regime. These defects can be attributed to the absence of an
appropriate legal framework for intellectual property tax
legislation.195 The current regime evolved over time as
particular concerns arose, but at no time was a framework of
rational intellectual property and tax policy objectives used in
developing rules to ensure a sound system.196 The following
193

Donors must inform charitable donees of their intent to treat the
contribution as a “qualified intellectual property contribution” and take additional
deductions in subsequent years based on the income accrued from the donated
property. I.R.C. § 170(m)(8)(B). Charitable donees must provide donors with written
substantiations explaining the amount of income derived from the donated intellectual
property during the tax year. Id. § 6050L(b)-(c). Further, charitable donees must file an
annual information return reporting their qualified donee income and other specified
information. Id.
194
See id. §§ 170(m)(8)(B), 6050L(b)-(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.6050L-2 (2008).
195
The Code contains several special rules that govern different types of
intellectual property. A few of the special provisions apply equally to a large group of
intellectual property assets. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 167(g)(6), 170(e)(1)(B)(iii), 170(m), 197
(2006). Most, however, are mutually exclusive, governing specific forms of intellectual
property. See, e.g., id. §§ 41, 167(f)(1), 167(g)(8), 174, 1221(a)(3), 1221(b)(3), 1235, 1253.
Some of these special provisions encourage certain intellectual property activities;
some close tax loopholes and remove perceived tax inequities; and some simplify rules
and eliminate tax uncertainties that existed under general tax principles. None were
enacted within a framework of rational intellectual property and tax policy objectives,
as suggested later in this article.
196
See supra note 195.
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questions illustrate some important considerations that could
help shape an appropriate framework for intellectual property
tax legislation. To what extent, if any, should the tax system
support the intellectual property system? And to what extent, if
any, should the tax system adopt distinctions among
intellectual property rights? If tax distinctions are adopted,
what is a rational basis for making coherent tax distinctions?
A.

Establishing the Role of the Tax System in Supporting
the Intellectual Property System

Inefficiencies in the intellectual property tax regime
may or may not be justified, depending on one’s view of
whether the tax system should support the intellectual
property system. As discussed above, the special tax provisions
designed to incentivize innovation197 have, in practice, failed to
achieve this goal.198 In addition, these special tax rules apply
only to the development of patents and patent-like property;
they do not extend to other types of intellectual property
creation, such as copyrights and trademarks.199 This tax policy
might be deemed efficient if one adopts a narrow view of the
overall social and economic benefits derived from intellectual
property,200 but under a broader view of intellectual property’s
positive effects, it might be deemed inefficient. To make this
determination, an appropriate legal framework for intellectual
property tax rules would consider the extent to which
harmonization between the intellectual property and taxation
schemes should be achieved. Specifically, what role should the
tax system play, if any, in promoting the intellectual property
system?
Few people would disagree that encouraging inventions
and works of authorship is critical to U.S. economic growth.
When the Founding Fathers included the Patent and Copyright
Clause of the Constitution,201 their words clearly conveyed the
197

See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 41 (2006) (credit for limited research expenditures); id.
§ 174 (deduction for limited research expenditures); id. § 1235 (capital-gains treatment
for limited assignments of innovations in the form of patents).
198
See supra notes 131-47 and accompanying text.
199
See, e.g., infra notes 220-30 and accompanying text.
200
It might be deemed efficient if one accepts a meaning of tax efficiency other
than the one used here. Indeed, some might argue that the “efficiency criterion
requires that a tax interfere as little as possible with people’s economic behavior.”
GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 11, at 29 (summarizing several different meanings of
tax efficiency); see also supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
201
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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objective of rewarding inventors with exclusive rights in their
inventions.202 The Founding Fathers believed that a rewardbased system would “promote the Progress of Science.”203 At the
same time, they also understood that unfettered rights would
not aid scientific progress and therefore placed a time limit on
the exclusivity for patents.204 The patent statute and its
subsequent amendments take a similar view.205 For an
invention to be granted a patent, it must be, among other

202

See Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 533-34 (1871) (“Letters
patent are not to be regarded as monopolies . . . but as public franchises granted to the
inventors of new and useful improvements for the purpose of securing to them, as such
inventors, for the limited term therein mentioned, the exclusive right and liberty to
make and use and vend to others to be used their own inventions, as tending to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts, and as matter of compensation to
the inventors for their labor, toil, and expense in making the inventions, and reducing
the same to practice for the public benefit, as contemplated by the Constitution and
sanctioned by the laws of Congress.”).
203
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55,
63 (1998) (“The balance between the interest in motivating innovation and
enlightenment by rewarding invention with patent protection on the one hand, and the
interest in avoiding monopolies that unnecessarily stifle competition on the other, has
been a feature of the federal patent laws since their inception.”).
204
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146
(1989) (“The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage
innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any
concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (“Patents are not given as favors . . . but are
meant to encourage invention by rewarding the inventor with the right, limited to a
term of years fixed by the patent, to exclude others from the use of his invention.”).
As demonstrated in Thomas Jefferson’s writings—which played an
influential role in shaping modern patent law—patent grants should only be issued by
the government to truly warranted inventions. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas
City, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (After a review of Thomas Jefferson’s writings and his
influences on shaping the patent system, the Court concluded, “Jefferson did not
believe in granting patents for small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous
devices. His writings evidence his insistence upon a high level of patentability.”); see
also Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 148 (“Today’s patent statute is remarkably similar to the
law as known to Jefferson in 1793. Protection is offered to ‘whoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof.’” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006))).
205
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (defining the categories of patentable invention broadly
to include “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or . . . improvement thereof”); id. § 103(a) (“A patent may not be obtained . . . ,
if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art . . . .”).
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things, novel and nonobvious;206 in other words, patents are
granted for innovation.207
Similarly, trade secret law was designed to foster
innovation and promote responsible business conduct.208 To that
end, trade secrets are treated as property, and courts have thus
held that regulations forcing trade secret disclosure amount to
a governmental taking of property for which the trade secret
owner must be justly compensated.209 Moreover, the law
206

See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (“Granting
patent protection to advances that would occur in the ordinary course without real
innovation retards progress and may, for patents combining previously known
elements, deprive prior inventions of their value or utility.”).
207
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (“It is the
province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by granting
inventors a monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited time, 35
U.S.C. §§ 154, 173, after which competitors are free to use the innovation.”); Bonito
Boats, 489 U.S. at 146 (“From their inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a
careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that
imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and
the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.”).
208
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (“The
maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention are
the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law.”). The Supreme Court has long
recognized that, with respect to innovations not eligible for patent protection, “[t]rade
secret law will encourage invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will
prompt the independent innovator to proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his
invention. Competition is fostered and the public is not deprived of the use of valuable,
if not quite patentable, invention.” Id. at 485. The Kewanee Oil Court also
acknowledged “the importance of trade secret protection to the subsidization of
research and development and to increased economic efficiency within large companies
through the dispersion of responsibilities for creative developments.” Id. at 482 (citing
Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 434-35 (Pa. 1960)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (“[T]he protection of trade secrets has been
justified as a means to encourage investment in research by providing an opportunity
to capture the returns from successful innovations.”). Not surprisingly, commentators
have had their disagreements on the justifications of trade secret protections. See, e.g.,
Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 391 (2008) (asserting that “the goal of trade
secret law is not to encourage the production of . . . information so much as the
production of . . . business”); Mark Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade
Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 314 (2008) (“Understanding trade
secrets . . . as imposing a consistent set of standards on claims that would otherwise be
based on disparate legal theories and claims of entitlement or free riding—advances
the goals of innovation and promotes responsible business conduct without limiting the
vigorous competition on which a market economy is based.”); Michael Risch, Why Do
We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 26 (2007) (“[C]reating
incentives to innovate is a very minor justification of trade secret law.”).
209
See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-04 (1984);
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 46 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that state
regulation requiring disclosure of the content of cigarettes was a taking of trade
secrets); E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 288 F.2d 904, 912 (Ct. Cl.
1961) (upholding takings claim); DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 14
(Cal. 2003) (holding that trade secrets represent a “constitutionally recognized property
interest in [information]”); 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE
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prohibits the unauthorized use or disclosure of trade secrets by
private parties; indeed, most states have statutes on the
misappropriation of trade secrets.210
Tracking the goals of intellectual property laws, the
current tax regime governing patents and patent-like property
was designed, although not optimally, to promote innovation
through various tax incentives (i.e., a research tax credit, a
current deduction for research expenditures, and reduced
capital-gains tax on patent assignments).211 The more complex
question, however, is the extent to which tax laws should
encourage other intellectual property activities. At first glance,
it is arguable that the current tax regime does not adequately
promote the goals of other types of intellectual property, such
as copyrights and trademarks—that it actually hinders those
goals. A closer look, however, reveals that most, if not all,
intellectual property rights (not just patents) achieve the same
objectives: innovation and/or efficiency. Patent and copyright
laws in general—and, to a lesser extent, trade secret laws—
focus on innovation.212 Trademark laws target efficiency in the
marketplace for both the producer and consumer of a
trademarked product or service.213 Given these similar
objectives, the disparate tax treatment of different types of
intellectual property is hard to justify.
The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to promote
the progress of both science and the useful arts, and as a
consequence, Congress has granted significant protections for
both patents and copyrights with “all that means for the social
and economic benefits.”214 The intellectual property system
encourages innovation by rewarding both inventors and
authors with exclusive rights in their inventions and works of
authorship for a limited time.215 Patentees and copyright owners
SECRETS § 2.01[2], at 21 (2010) (“Practically all jurisdictions have recognized that a
trade secret is property,” at least in certain senses.).
210
See David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act,
19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769, 772-75 (2009) (discussing state
statutes on trade secrets).
211
See supra notes 130-47, 151-54 and accompanying text.
212
See infra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
213
See infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
214
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (“The subject-matter
provisions of the patent law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional
and statutory goal of promoting ‘the Progress of Science and the useful Arts’ with all
that means for the social and economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson.”).
215
Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 292, 320 (1833) (“The patent law was
designed for the public benefit, as well as for the benefit of inventors. For a valuable
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can exploit their intellectual property rights for economic
gain.216 The public benefits greatly from the innovations, as
more inventors and authors create more programs and
technologies that transform every industry, from biotechnology
to communications and entertainment.217 Furthermore, even
after a patent or copyright expires, the patent or copyright
becomes part of the public domain; at that point, the public is
free to use the knowledge embodied in the expired patent or to
copy and distribute the works.218 With these similarities in goals
and substantive protections,219 one would expect the tax system
to treat patents and copyrights similarly. This has never been
the case.
Although substantive copyright laws serve to encourage
creative genius and the release of the products of creative
genius to the public, the current tax system is not aligned with
this objective. A tax credit, while available for patent
development costs, does not exist for copyright creation
expenditures.220 Tax deduction rules do not adequately
incentivize creation activities, generally requiring the
capitalization of copyright creation costs.221 Moreover, tax rules
governing copyright assignments are quite harsh. Indeed, since
1950, Congress has prevented individual copyright creators
from receiving capital-gains treatment upon the sales of their
copyrights.222 Conversely, patent developers were not covered by
invention, the public, on the inventor’s complying with certain conditions, give him, for
a limited period, the profits arising from the sale of the thing invented. This holds out
an inducement for the exercise of [genius] and skill in making discoveries which may
be useful to society, and profitable to the discoverer.”); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964).
216
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)
(“By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies
the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”).
217
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”).
218
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative
labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate [the creation of useful
works] for the general public good.”).
219
See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
220
The research tax credit applies only to expenses incurred in the
experimental or laboratory sense, and it does not apply to research conducted in the
“social sciences, arts, or humanities.” I.R.C. § 41(d) (2006).
221
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
222
Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 210, 64 Stat. 906, 932-33 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 1221(a)(3) (2006)).
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the 1950 legislation and, to this day, may be eligible for capitalgains treatment upon the sales of their patents.223 Finally,
although all intellectual property donors now receive an initial
charitable deduction equal to the donor’s tax basis, between
1969 and 2004, patent donors (but not copyright donors)
received an initial deduction equal to the property’s fair market
value at the time of contribution.224 An appropriate legal
framework for intellectual property taxation would consider
harmonization between the copyright system and the tax
system.
In contrast to patent and copyright laws, the goal of
trademark law is not to reward innovations of products or
225
but rather, to facilitate efficiency.226 Ironically,
services,
however, the tax rules governing trademarks and trade names
were not designed with these efficiency goals in mind.
Capitalized trademark and trade name costs were not
depreciable or amortizable at all prior to 1956, nor between
1986 and 1993. During these periods, they could only be
recovered upon the abandonment or sale of the mark or name,
reflecting a government doubt that investment in trademark
and trade names produced social benefits that market forces
might adequately reflect.227 The capitalized costs of patents,
however, have always been eligible for depreciation
allowances.228 As another example, Congress enacted a special
provision in 1969 mandating ordinary income treatment on
contingent payments received in a trademark or trade name
transfer, regardless of whether the transfer is, in substance, a

223

I.R.C. § 1235 (2006).
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(a), 83 Stat. 487, 549
(current version at I.R.C. § 170 (2006)) (targeting self-created copyrights but not selfdeveloped patents). In 2004, Congress amended the charitable deduction provision by
eliminating the fair market value standard for contributions of most all forms of
intellectual property, and reducing the initial amount a donor may deduct. American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 882, 118 Stat. 1418, 1627 (codified as
amended in I.R.C. §§ 170(e)(1)(B)(iii), 170(m), 6050L (2006)).
225
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
226
See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
227
See S. REP. NO. 99-313 (1986) (Comm. Rep.). With the enactment of Section
197 in 1993, capitalized trademark and trade name costs became amortizable ratably
over a fifteen-year period. I.R.C. §§ 197(a), (c)(1)(B) (2006).
228
An early Treasury regulation provided that if an acquired intangible asset
could be shown to have a limited useful life, then the capitalized acquisition costs were
recoverable over that asset’s useful lifetime. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in
2004). Under this rule, patents were eligible for depreciation due to the fact that they
have limited useful lives (twenty years). See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2), (d).
224
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sale or a license.229 For patent transfers, in contrast, the nature
of the payments (contingent or noncontingent) is irrelevant in
determining tax consequences.230
An appropriate legal framework for tax legislation
governing intellectual property rights should consider the
extent to which the tax system is harmonious with the
intellectual property goals identified above. Admittedly,
maintaining harmony with intellectual property goals can be
challenging in a rapidly changing technology and business
environment. For instance, special tax incentives for innovative
developments were enacted more than fifty years ago.231 Since
then, there has been a major shift in the innovation market
towards a segmentation model.232 Desirable transfers of
innovation between both segments can be either supported or
hindered by the income tax system. An appropriate framework
might consider the commercial and business realities of
innovation segmentation, and suggest that tax incentives
encouraging greater research activity and supporting economic
growth should not be limited to the innovation development
market alone. The result might be more favorable tax rules
governing assignments to private market acquirers and
governing donations to research universities—rules that
achieve optimal innovation outcomes and enhance economic
growth.
Another contemporary phenomenon has been the
change in the use of patents in business strategy. In recent
years, businesses have looked to patent acquisition for
licensing purposes or offensive-use purposes (e.g., to threaten
229

I.R.C. § 1253(c) (2006).
Early on, the government and courts struggled with the issue of whether a
patent assignment should be denied capital-gains treatment solely because the
purchase price took the form of contingent payments. Some courts held that the receipt
of contingent payments did not prevent a transfer from being considered a sale. See,
e.g., Comm’r v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 140 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (consideration in
the form of future royalties); Comm’r v. Hopkinson, 126 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1942) (same).
Others held the receipt of contingent payments did preclude sale treatment. See, e.g.,
Bloch v. United States, 200 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1952) (consideration in the form of future
royalties). In 1958, the Service issued an administrative pronouncement, ruling that
patent transferors could enjoy “sale” treatment (and, hence, capital-gains treatment)
even though consideration received is measured by production, use, or sale of the
patented article. Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 C.B. 408.
231
Sections 174 (deduction for limited research and experimental
expenditures) and 1235 (safe harbor providing capital-gains treatment for limited
assignments of patents) were enacted in 1954, while Section 41 (tax credit for limited
research expenditures) was enacted much later in 1981. I.R.C. §§ 41, 174, 1235 (2006).
232
See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
230
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other companies with litigation), as opposed to manufacturing
purposes. An appropriate framework would consider the extent
to which the tax system should support or discourage this
paradigm shift. The current tax system treats all innovation
acquisitions alike.233 But the innovation goals behind patent
rights are tied to the strategic reasons for their acquisition. In
particular, patent acquisition for offensive-use purposes
frustrates innovation.234 To promote scientific progress and
other innovation goals, then, perhaps the tax system should
support the licensing model and not the offensive-use model.
B.

Establishing a Rational Basis for Coherent Tax
Distinctions Among Intellectual Property Rights

Inequities and administrative inefficiencies in the
intellectual property tax system result largely from the
modeling of tax distinctions on intellectual property law labels.
In many cases, special tax rules governing intellectual property
adopt an asset-specific approach, applying to one or more
specific types of intellectual property and specifically defined
for tax purposes. For example, Section 1235 of the Code applies
only to transfers of patents as specifically defined for tax
purposes;235 Section 1221(b)(3) applies only to transfers of
copyrights in musical works;236 and Section 1253 applies to
transfers of trademarks and trade names, each of which is
specifically defined for tax purposes.237
Some Code provisions make no tax distinctions among
the different types of intellectual property. These provisions
adopt a “grouping approach,” attempting to affect a larger
233

See supra note 195.
See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
235
I.R.C. § 1235(a) (2006) (guaranteeing capital-gains treatment for any
transfer of all substantial rights to a patent by a statutorily defined holder to an
unrelated party); Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(a) (as amended in 1980) (providing definition
of patent for purposes of Section 1235).
236
I.R.C. § 1221(b)(3) (2006) (providing that, at the election of a taxpayer, the
Section 1221(a)(1) and (a)(3) exclusions from capital asset status do not apply to
musical compositions or copyrights in musical works sold or exchanged by a taxpayer
described in Section 1221(a)(3)).
237
Id. § 1253(a) (requiring ordinary income treatment on contingent payments
received for the transfer of a trademark or trade name, and requiring ordinary income
treatment on noncontingent payments received for the transfer of a trademark or trade
name if the transferor retains any significant power, right, or continuing interest with
respect to the subject matter of the mark or name). The terms trademark and trade
name were broadly defined in regulations that were proposed in 1971, but eventually
withdrawn due to a sunset provision. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1253-1 to -3, 36 Fed. Reg.
13148 (July 15, 1971), withdrawn, 58 Fed. Reg. 25587 (Apr. 27, 1993).
234
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group of intellectual property assets by listing the various
types of intellectual property assets within the scope of the
provisions. Section 170—which contains a special charitable
tax deduction provision applicable to intellectual property—
takes a true “grouping” approach, applying to “any patent,
copyright . . . , trademark, trade name, trade secret, know-how,
software . . . , or similar property, or applications or
registrations of such property.”238 Section 197—which imposes a
mandatory fifteen-year amortization schedule for certain
capitalized costs—does the same, applying to “any patent,
copyright, formula, process, design, pattern, knowhow, format,
or other similar item,” and “any trademark or trade name.”239
Interestingly, these provisions adopting a grouping approach
avoid using the broader term “intellectual property.”240
1. Deciding Whether the Tax System Should Adopt Tax
Distinctions
Drafters of any tax legislation must consider the scope
of the particular provision. Thus, a legal framework for
intellectual property taxation should consider whether to adopt
tax distinctions for intellectual property areas. A risk of
adopting tax distinctions among different types of intellectual
property is that the tax system may not be flexible enough to
be applied to future innovations and changes in intellectual
property.
Internet domain names are a prime example of an
intellectual property movement that has outstripped the
present tax system. Under the current regime, specific tax
rules do not exist for domain names, which are valuable assets
that emerged with the arrival of global e-commerce
transactions on the Internet.241 Are domain names merely
variations of traditional forms of intellectual property and
other intangible rights to which the existing tax regime can be
applied? As the authors have previously argued, domain names
that function as source identifiers might be treated under the
238

I.R.C. § 170(e)(1)(B)(iii) (2006) (emphasis added).
Id. §§ 197(d)(1)(C)(iii), (d)(1)(F) (emphasis added).
240
The term “intellectual property” was first mentioned in Davoll v. Brown, 1
Woodb. & M. 53, 7 F. Cas. 197, 199 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845). Peter S. Menell, Intellectual
Property and the Property Rights Movement, 30 REGULATION 36, 37 (2007), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv30n3/v30n3-6.pdf.
241
See, e.g., Domain Name Prices Rise Again, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Dec. 29,
2003, at A02.
239
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current tax rules applicable to trademarks, but generic domain
names possess “inherent” goodwill unaddressed by the existing
tax regime.242
Another example of the administrative difficulties of an
inflexible tax system with distinct rules for different types of
intellectual property is what we identify as the “Coca-Cola”
problem. In business practice today, many different types of
intellectual property are often bundled together, as many forms
of intellectual property protection are available for a particular
product or service.243 This bundling phenomenon raises the
question: How should a particular transaction involving
bundled intellectual property assets be treated for tax purposes
under an asset-specific tax regime that maintains distinct rules
for different types of intellectual property?
There are a “bundle” of intellectual property rights
embodied inside and outside each Coca-Cola can or bottle. The
trademark Coca-Cola was worth about $68.734 billion in
2009.244 It is not any ordinary trademark; it is a brand with a
large equity built through years of advertisements,
distributions, and uses in commerce worldwide.245 Coca-Cola
created goodwill in the trademark over the years that is
attached and associated with that trademark.246

242

Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Taxing the New Intellectual
Property Right, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Nguyen & Maine, Taxing the
New IP Right].
243
Additionally, companies often bundle different types of intellectual
property assets when they license in or out for the daily business operation. See
generally Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Bankrupting Trademarks, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1267, 1309-10 (2004) (observing the bundling of trademarks and other intellectual
property assets in licensing practices); Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman,
Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455 (2002)
(noting the integration and simultaneous use of patents and trademarks in business
practice and calling for a new theory of intellectual property to address the integration
of different types of intellectual property).
244
Best Global Brands 2009, INTERBRAND, http://www.interbrand.com/en/
best-global-brands/best-global-brands-2008/best-global-brands-2009.aspx (last visited
Sept. 13, 2010).
245
Brand equity has been equated with the concept of goodwill, which has
been defined as “that which makes tomorrow’s business more than an accident. It is
the reasonable expectation of future patronage based on past satisfactory dealings . . .
[that] gives [the business] a selling value above that of its leasehold, equipment and
stock.” EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOOD WILL, TRADE-MARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 13 (1914).
246
See Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 555-56
(1993) (“Although the definition of goodwill has taken different forms over the years,
the shorthand description of goodwill as ‘the expectancy of continued patronage,’
provides a useful label with which to identify the total of all the imponderable qualities
that attract customers to the business.” (quoting Boe v. Comm’r, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th
Cir. 1962)) (internal citation omitted)).
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The Coke bottle has a unique shape that deserves trade
dress protection.247 Indeed, courts have mentioned the Coke
bottle as an example of trade dress worthy of legal protection.248
Trade dress protection extends to the product’s packaging, and
its overall look and feel that serve as a source identifier in the
eyes of the consumer.249 Protected trade dress enjoys a similar
protection available to trademarks under federal and state
laws.250 The distinctive red and white design on the Coke tin
can is easily recognizable today. The consumer walking down a
beverage aisle has no difficulty distinguishing a pack of Coke
cans from the others.251 This design is protected under
trademark law.252
247

See Gary Myers, Statutory Interpretation, Property Rights, and
Boundaries: The Nature and Limits of Protection in Trademark Dilution, Trade Dress,
and Product Configuration Cases, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 241, 260 (2000) (“[N]ot
only is the name Coca-Cola protectable, but so is the red-and-white swirl packaging of
its producer’s cans and the distinctive shape of the old-fashioned Coke bottle.”).
248
E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000) (“[A]
classic glass Coca Cola bottle, for instance, may constitute packaging for those
consumers who drink the Coke and then discard the bottle, but may constitute the
product itself for those consumers who are bottle collectors, or part of the product itself
for those consumers who buy Coke in the classic glass bottle, rather than a can,
because they think it more stylish to drink from the former.”).
249
See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28 (2001) (“It
is well established that trade dress can be protected under federal law. The design or
packaging of a product may acquire a distinctiveness which serves to identify the
product with its manufacturer or source; and a design or package which acquires this
secondary meaning, assuming other requisites are met, is a trade dress which may not
be used in a manner likely to cause confusion as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval
of the goods.”); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775-76 (1992)
(providing trade dress protection for the look and feel of a fast food restaurant); see also
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2006) (“In a civil action for trade dress infringement under this
chapter for trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who asserts
trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected
is not functional.”).
250
See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003) (stating
that federal unfair competition law “broadly prohibits uses of trademarks, trade
names, and trade dress that are likely to cause confusion about the source of a product
or service”), superseded by statute, Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 § 2, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006); Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 209 (observing that the federal
Lanham Act extends protections to “word marks, such as ‘Nike,’ and symbol marks,
such as Nike’s ‘swoosh’ symbol, but also ‘trade dress’—a category that originally
included only the packaging, or ‘dressing,’ of a product . . . [and] the design of a
product”); see also Astoria Indus. of Iowa, Inc. v. Brand FX Body Co., No. 2-08-144-CV,
2010 WL 1433404, at *7-8 (Tex. App. Apr. 8, 2010) (holding that Texas unfair
competition law against misappropriation of non-functional trade dress design is not
preempted by federal patent law and affirming the trial court’s decision in favor of the
plaintiff on the state claim of unfair competition against misappropriation).
251
Dana M. Herberholz, Curing Confusion: An Overview of the Regulatory
Complexities of Obtaining Pharmaceutical Trademarks and Prescription for Reform, 8
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 97, 100 (2007) (“The protections of trademark law enable the
supermarket customer to choose to purchase COCA-COLA® to the exclusion of other
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The Coke formula is a well-kept trade secret that
ensures the success of the beverage.253 Others have tried to
imitate the brown-colored drink but could not. Other brown
drinks are sold under trademarks, such as Pepsi-Cola and Dr.
Pepper, but none approaches the unique taste of Coke.254 There
is no doubt that the trade secret of the Coke formula is very
valuable.255
A legal framework for intellectual property taxation
should consider the most efficient manner to reflect the
evolution of intellectual property rights and the realities of a
changing economy. Consider a transaction involving the
bundling of intellectual property rights embodied inside and
outside each Coca-Cola can or bottle. A tax system that groups
together various intellectual property rights for tax purposes
might be more easily applied in practice than a system that
adopts separate tax rules for separate transactions involving
differing types of intellectual property. The grouping approach
would avoid questions over whether the tax results should be
dictated by focusing on the trademark Coca-Cola, on the trade
dress of the Coke can, or on the trade secret of the Coke
formula. When focused on all three of these rights as one
unified asset, a grouping approach would also eliminate messy
allocation and valuation issues.
The current tax system adopts a grouping approach for
many acquisitions of intellectual property (i.e., intellectual
colas, knowing that the famous red label showcasing white letters refers to a particular
and familiar brand of cola.”).
252
See Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1183
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (granting Coca-Cola’s motion to enjoin defendant from using CocaCola’s red sign and white script to sell posters saying, “Enjoy Cocaine”).
253
See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288,
286 (D. Del. 1985) (finding that the Coca-Cola formula is “one of the best-kept trade
secrets in the world” and that it is kept locked away in an Atlanta bank vault which
may “only be opened upon a resolution from the Company’s Board of Directors”).
254
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1323-24 (11th Cir.
2008) (upholding conspiracy convictions for defendants who attempted to sell CocaCola’s formula to Pepsi, noting the severity of harm that Coca-Cola could have suffered
if defendants had been successful).
255
See id.; Coca-Cola Co. v. Reed Indus., Inc., 864 F.2d 150 (Table), 1988 WL
124469, at *1 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming the district court’s injunction against the
defendants in a case brought by Coca-Cola for misappropriation of its Coke formulas);
Xpel Techs. Corp. v. Am. Filter Film Distribs., No. SA-08-CA-175-XR, 2008 WL
3540345, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2008) (“Take for example the formula for making
Coca-Cola. This formula is a trade secret possessed by The Coca-Cola Company. If a
competitor surreptitiously eavesdropped on an internal conversation in which Coke
employees were discussing this formula, and if this competitor then started using the
improperly acquired formula in the making of its products, Coca-Cola would justifiably
be upset.”).
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property acquired as part of the acquisition of assets
constituting the acquisition of a trade or business). Section 197,
which was enacted in 1993 to simplify tax depreciation rules
for intangible property, adopts a single depreciation method—a
straight-line method—and a single, fifteen-year recovery period
for the capitalized costs of acquiring many forms of intellectual
property.256 Thus, a purchaser of the bundle of intellectual
property rights embodied in the Coca-Cola product (trademark,
trade dress, and trade secret rights) would amortize the total
purchase price ratably over fifteen years.
In contrast to its treatment of intellectual property
acquisitions, the tax regime does not adopt a grouping
approach for the sale of intellectual property. Instead, the Code
contains special tax rules for the assignment of trademarks,257
and it relies on general tax rules for the assignment of trade
secrets and trade dress rights.258 Thus, the seller of a bundle of
intellectual property rights embodied in the Coca-Cola product
would be required to allocate the sales price among the various
intellectual property rights and apply different tax rules to
each in order to determine the tax results.259 This would not be
an easy task in light of the bundling of the various intellectual
property rights.
The bundling problem, as highlighted in the Coca-Cola
example above, also arises in the context of billboards. Each
billboard—advertising, for example, Nike products, Marlboro
cigarettes, or Wrigley gum—is a copyrighted work of
authorship.260 The creators express their ideas in a tangible
medium that conveys a message embedded in the depiction.
The author of a billboard may be a freelance artist or an

256

I.R.C. § 197 (2006). See TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 166, at 147
(explaining that Congress created Section 197 to streamline federal taxation of
intangible assets).
257
I.R.C. § 1253 (2006).
258
Id. §§ 1221, 1222, 1231.
259
Gain from the sale of the trademark would be ordinary income if payments
were contingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the mark, or if payments
were noncontingent and the transferor retained any significant power, right or
continuing interest with respect to the subject matter of the mark. Id. § 1253(a)-(c). In
contrast, gain from the sale of the trade secret most likely would be treated as capital
gain under general capital-gains provisions. Id. §§ 1221, 1222, 1231.
260
See Kleier Adver., Inc. v. Premier Pontiac, Inc., 921 F.2d 1036, 1038 (10th
Cir. 1990) (involving copyright infringement brought by an advertising company
against an automobile dealership and advertising agency for the allegedly infringing
use of the copyrighted billboard).
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employee of an advertising agency.261 The contractual
agreements between the product company and the author set
forth the identity of the copyright owner.262 The billboard and
its associated costs contribute to the building of the recognition,
reputation, and goodwill embodied in the trademark or trade
dress of each featured product. This bundling of intellectual
rights in billboards raises interesting questions. For instance,
how should billboard development costs be treated for tax
purposes? Should costs be viewed as copyright development
costs? Should such costs be treated as part of the development
of a trademark or trade dress? Or should costs be treated as
general advertising expenditures? The tax results under the
current system depend on the answers to these questions.263 A
more efficient regime would produce similar results regardless.
Another classic example of the bundling of rights is
computer software. For instance, Microsoft Windows is a group
of complex software programs covered by many copyrights.264
Each time a newer version of the software is created, there is a
potential new copyright.265 Additionally, certain functions for

261

Id. In Kleier Advertising, the author of the copyrighted billboard “Beat the
Pants” advertisement program was an advertisement agency with many employees and
the billboard program “has been a traffic-stopping success in forty geographical
markets throughout the United States and Canada.” Id.
262
Id. (noting that if a company wants to use the “Beat the Pants” billboard
ad, it must obtain a license from the advertisement agency).
263
Under the current intellectual property taxation regime, copyright
development costs incurred by a corporation are not currently deductible, but must be
capitalized. I.R.C. §§ 263(a), 263A(a)-(b) (2006); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(ii)-(iii), -4(d)
(2004). The costs of building up the goodwill value in a trademark are generally treated as
deductible advertising costs, see Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57, but fees paid to the
Trademark Office for trademark protection are not currently deductible, Treas. Reg.
§ 1.263(a)-4(l), ex. 9(i) (2004). The actual costs of building the tangible property (the physical
billboard itself), are not deductible but must be capitalized. Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57.
264
See Microsoft Corp. v. Liu, No. 1:06-CV-1352-JOF, 2007 WL 4125753, at *3
(N.D. Ga. Oct. 31, 2007) (listing the certificates of copyright registrations for some of
Microsoft Windows software programs, including (1) TX 4-905-936 (“Office 2000 Pro”);
(2) TX 4-905-950 (“Access 2000”); (3) TX 4-905-949 (“Excel 2000”); (4) TX 4-906-019
(“Outlook 2000”); (5) TX 4-905-952 (“PowerPoint 2000”); (6) TX 4-905-951 (“Word
2000”); (7) TX 4-905-937 (“Publisher 2000”); (8) TX 4-309-301 (“FrontPage 2000”); and
(9) TX 4-899-117 (“PhotoDraw 2000”)).
265
See Dispatch Automation, Inc. v. Richards, 280 F.3d 1116, 1120 (7th Cir.
2002) (noting that software developers do not register numerous versions of the
software as new versions are continually being created) (“One might wonder why, if the
code for RiMS 2000 is as different from the code for its predecessors as Dispatch
Automation claims, neither Dispatch Automation nor Richards has registered it with
the Copyright Office. Asked this question at his deposition, Richards answered that ‘if
you tried to submit a copyright application every time there was a new version of the
program you would spend all your time trying to continually recopyright the program
since . . . the program changed literally hundreds of times that day.’”).
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Windows software programs are covered by patents.266
Moreover, there is proprietary information and know-how
embodied in Windows that is protected by trade secret law.267
The name “Windows” is a known trademark, identifying the
products widely installed in most computers and used by
millions.268 The four curving, colorful panels of the Windows
logo are also entitled to protection under trademark law.269 An
administratively efficient tax system would be equipped to
address a transaction involving the complex network of
software seen in Windows.
Another example of the “Coca-Cola” bundling problem is
video games. In 2008, the revenue for games and supporting
systems, software, and accessories reached $21.33 billion,270 and
the number has been projected to increase to $48.9 billion by
2011.271 A recent study revealed that the video-game industry
employed 32,000 people in thirty-four states, and in 2009, these
employees received $2.9 billion in compensation.272 Another
study reported that the video-game industry is growing faster
than other industries and has surpassed the ailing music
industry.273 The creators, publishers, and distributors of video
games rely on the bundling of different types of intellectual
property for the daily operation of their businesses. For
266

Benjamin J. Kormos, Giving Frankenstein a Soul: Imposing Patentee
Obligations, 21 INTELL. PROP. J. 309, 341 (2009) (“As of 2007, Microsoft held more than
6,000 software patents.”).
267
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Conditions and Covenants in License Contracts:
Tales From a Test of the Artistic License, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 335, 338 (2009)
(observing that Microsoft and other software companies rely on trade secret protection
afforded to software programs distributed in binary form).
268
Microsoft has brought legal actions for using its well-known Windows
trademark. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., No. C01-2115C, 2002 WL
31499324 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 2002).
269
See Microsoft Corp. v. Silver Star Micro, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-1350-WSD, 2008
WL 115006, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 9, 2008) (listing the various trademark registrations for
Microsoft “flag” logos that were the subject of a successful trademark infringement case).
270
2008 US Video Game Sales Reached $21.33 Bln, IT FACTS (Jan. 15, 2009),
http://www.itfacts.biz/2008-us-video-game-sales-reached-2133-bln/12439.
271
Ralph Baer, Genesis: How the Home Video Games Industry Began,
http://www.ralphbaer.com/how_video_games.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2009)
(recounting the history of home video games); Georg Szalai, Video Game Industry
Growth Still Strong: Study, REUTERS (June 21, 2007, 4:41 AM), http://www.reuters.
com/article/idUSN2132172920070623.
272
STEPHEN E. SICNEK, ENTM’T SOFTWARE ASS’N, VIDEO GAMES IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 1 (2010), available at http://www.theesa.com/facts/pdfs/VideoGames21stCentury_
2010.pdf.
273
Szalai, supra note 271 (“The video game sector will remain one of the
above-average growth segments of the global entertainment industries through 2011,
with global games spending set to exceed music spending this year.”).
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example, game companies seek patent procurements for new
game functions and initiate infringement litigation against
other game companies for violations involving patent-related
video games.274 Likewise, game companies utilize trademark
law to protect the goodwill accumulated in video-game names
and to enforce the trademarks against unauthorized use of
similar or identical games that are likely to cause consumer
confusion.275 In addition, game companies may rely on trade
dress law to protect the look and feel of their game displays.276
Most often, companies rely on copyright law for the protection
of their games and prohibition of infringements.277 In reality,
video games are all about software; indeed, the industry terms
these games “entertainment software.”278
These four bundling examples in the beverage,
advertising, software, and game industries are reminders that
companies today rely on many different types of intellectual
property. These examples are not the exception; they are the
norm. For example, in the biotech or biopharma industry, drug
279
companies rely on patents and trade secrets for the protection
of their research, development, and invention of certain

274

See, e.g., Hochstein v. Microsoft Corp., No. 04-73071, 2008 WL 4387594
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 24, 2008) (involving a video-game patent titled “Apparatus and
Method for Electrically Connecting Remotely Located Video Games,” U.S. Patent No.
5,292,125); Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 770 F. Supp. 161, 162 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (noting that the U.S. Patent No. 4,026,555 (the 555 patent) is “a patent that
involves the earliest video games”).
275
E.g., Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Brown, 94 F.3d 652 (Table), 1996 WL 468590,
at *1 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The record supports the district court’s determination that
consumer confusion would occur about the origin of the video games at issue because
they were virtually identical to the games sold by Nintendo.”); see also Sony Computer
Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000) (trademark dilution claim
in a case involving console video games).
276
See, e.g., Incredible Techs., Inc. v. Virtual Techs., Inc., 400 F.3d 1007 (7th
Cir. 2005) (copyright claims in the video game instructions and display, trade dress
infringement claims).
277
See, e.g., Wakefield v. Walt Disney Co., 321 F. App’x 685 (9th Cir. 2009)
(copyright protection and infringement claims of Kingdom Hearts video games), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 752 (2009); Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. Bleem, L.L.C., 214
F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000) (action alleging that developer’s use of “screen shots” from
manufacturer’s games in developer’s advertising violated manufacturer’s copyright);
Nintendo, 94 F.3d 652 (Table), 1996 WL 468590 (affirming copyright and trademark
infringement claims because defendant’s games were identical to plaintiff’s games);
Frybarger v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 812 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1987) (analyzing copyright
infringement claim between two video games).
278
See Economic Data, ENTM’T SOFTWARE ASS’N, http://www.theesa.com/facts/
econdata.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2010).
279
See generally Pharmaceutical Patents, INNOVATION.ORG, http://www.
innovation.org/documents/File/Pharmaceutical_Patents.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2010).
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drugs.280 Drug companies also rely on copyrights, trade dress,
and trademarks in their advertising campaigns. To market and
sell their drugs, for instance, drug companies use trademarks
along with pamphlets and instructions.
As these examples illustrate, the rigidity of the current
intellectual property taxation scheme renders it incongruent
with the realities of the current intellectual property system.
Specifically, it is difficult to analyze the tax results of domain
names and other Internet-based intangibles, as well as the tax
results of transactions involving integrated intellectual
property. Thus, an appropriate legal framework for intellectual
property tax rules should ensure adequate flexibility in rules to
deal with the evolution of intellectual property and the reality
of the changing economy. A tax system flexible enough to
account for new intangible rights and emerging intellectual
property trends, such as the integration and simultaneous use
of intellectual property, would achieve clearer tax results as
well as administrative efficiency.
2. Determining a Basis for Tax Distinctions
If the tax system adopts distinctions for different types
of intellectual property rights, then, to minimize inequities, a
legal framework for tax rules should question whether
substantive differences among forms of intellectual property
justify different tax results for each form. While all types of
intellectual property share certain common characteristics,
there are substantive differences among the forms. A patent is
issued for 20 years, and a copyright is in force for the life of the
author plus 70 years (or 95 years, or in the case of a hired
creator, 120 years).281 The protection for trademarks or trade
names, by contrast, continues for as long as they are used in
commerce.282 To what extent, if any, should these and other
substantive differences justify different tax results? Under
present rules, the receipt of contingent payments in patent and
copyright transfers is treated vastly differently from the receipt
280

See, e.g., Shankar Vedantam, Antidepressant Makers Withhold Data on
Children, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2004, at A1.
281
See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
282
A trademark right is based on use. Abandonment of a trademark occurs when
the owner stops using the trademark in commerce. Federal trademark law presumes
abandonment after three years of non-use of the trademark. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
Abandonment of a trademark could occur if the owner failed to police the trademark so that
it becomes the generic name for the product or service with which it is used. Id.
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of contingent payments in trademark and trade name
transfers.283 One commentator has argued that the only major
substantive difference among these forms—duration—does not
justify differing effects in contingent payments.284 But perhaps
there are other substantive differences supporting differing tax
results; for example, patents and copyrights further innovation
goals, whereas trademarks further efficiency goals. An
appropriate legal framework would focus attention on this
issue and yield fewer perceived tax inequities.
If tax distinctions are deemed justified based on
substantive differences among intellectual property forms, a
framework should question whether the different types of
intellectual property are treated in an appropriate manner visà-vis one another. Assume, for example, that patents and
copyrights should be treated as equals for tax purposes due to
their substantive similarities (because both serve to promote
science and the arts)285 and that, conversely, trademarks should
be treated differently for tax purposes (because they serve the
different purpose of protecting consumers and trademark
owners).286 A legal framework for analyzing intellectual
property tax rules would question whether the treatment of
patents and copyrights as one group, and trademarks as
another, is an appropriate method of achieving true equity.
As an alternative to focusing on the legal attributes of
intellectual property and basing tax distinctions upon their
substantive differences, a tax framework might base tax
distinctions on the purposes that intellectual property assets
serve. For example, instead of developing separate rules for
identified intangibles (such as patents, trade secrets,
copyrights, trademarks, trade names, and computer software),
creating legal definitions, and carving out exceptions, a tax
system could develop separate rules for “technology-based
intangible assets,” “marketing-based intangible assets,” and
“artistic-based intangible assets.”287
283

See supra notes 93, 229-30 and accompanying text.
See Daniel A. Izzo, Contingent Payment Transfers of Trademarks: A Sale in
License Clothing, 12 VA. TAX REV. 263, 275-76 (1992).
285
See supra notes 31-47 and accompanying text.
286
See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
287
With respect to accounting for business combinations, this is the approach
that was adopted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). See FASB,
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 141 (BUSINESS COMBINATIONS)
app. F (2007). Technology-based intangibles include, for example, patents, unpatented
technology, software, trade secrets, etc. Marketing-based intangibles include
284
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Basing tax distinctions upon intellectual property uses,
as opposed to intellectual property definitions, might yield a
more flexible tax system capable of handling future innovations
and intellectual property movements. As noted above, special
tax rules governing intellectual property do not currently
address domain names.288 It is arguable that domain names
functioning as trademarks be treated as trademarks under
current tax rules.289 But under this framework, they might fall
within the category of “technology-based intangible assets” and
thus might be treated like the other intangible assets in that
category, such as patented and unpatented technology, trade
secrets, etc. As with domain names, current tax rules do not
specifically deal with websites.290 Instead of treating the various
components of a website differently based on current tax
treatment of software, copyrightable content, and noncopyrightable content, the proposed framework might treat the
website as a whole as a “marketing-related intangible asset.”
Such an approach might also eliminate problems caused by the
bundling of intellectual property in business practice.
A tax system emphasizing intellectual property uses, as
opposed to legal attributes, might yield more rational tax
distinctions. Currently, for example, trademark and trade
secret acquisition costs are treated the same for tax purposes.291
However, it might be justifiable to treat a trade secret used as
a technology-based intangible asset differently from a
trademark used as a marketing based intangible asset.
Likewise, it might be justifiable to treat a copyright that is
classified as an artistic-related intangible (e.g., a book, play, or
musical work) differently from a copyright that classified as a
marketing-related intangible asset (e.g., advertising materials).
trademarks, service marks, trade names, brand names, Internet domain names, etc.
Artistic-based intangibles include literary works and copyrights, musical works,
photography, maps, etc.; see also FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS NO. 142 (GOODWILL AND OTHER INTANGIBLE ASSETS) (2008).
288
See generally Nguyen & Maine, Taxing the New IP Right, supra note 242.
289
Id.
290
Under the current tax rules, taxpayers and advisors are left with
questions, such as: Should the costs relating to the development of a website be treated
the same as software development costs? How should the costs of creating or
purchasing content for websites be treated? Does it make a difference if some website
content is copyrightable or non-copyrightable? If websites are considered variations of
existing intellectual or intangible property rights to which the existing tax law can be
adopted, then the tax treatment of websites might depend on the website’s components
(e.g., software, copyrightable content, non-copyrightable content). This approach is not
easily applied in practice.
291
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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This approach would ensure consistency because a copyright on
a book (an artistic-related intangible) would necessarily be
treated in the same way as a copyright on a musical work (also
an artistic-related intangible). Current law does not treat these
copyrights similarly.292
A system focusing on intellectual property uses would
also eliminate the debate over whether emphasis should be on
protections available or protections actually obtained. Certain
property—such as computer software—is eligible for more than
one type of intellectual property protection.293 This circumstance
raises the question of whether tax consequences should be
affected by the protections available (e.g., patent, copyright,
trade secret), or whether tax consequences should depend on
the actual protections obtained. Consider the tax treatment of
an assignment of computer software or a design patent. Under
current tax rules, a capital asset does not include any copyright
in the hands of the person who created it.294 An interesting
question that arises is whether this copyright exclusion applies
when property, such as a design patent or computer software,
is both patentable and copyrightable. Under current rules, the
copyright exclusion does not apply if “a patent or an invention,
or a design . . . may be protected only under the patent law and
not under the copyrightable law.”295 As a result, design patents,
which are “eligible for both patent and copyright protection,”
are subject to the copyright exclusion. Likewise, computer
software, which is copyrightable but often protected through a
trade secret agreement, is also subject to the copyright

292

See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
Copyright law has traditionally served as the source of legal protection for
computer programs. See, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Arctic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870,
875 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he copyrightability of computer programs is firmly established
after the 1980 amendment to the Copyright Act . . . .”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
In addition to copyright law, patent protection has been extended to computer software
inventions which are also known as Internet patents or business method patents. See
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (holding that business method inventions are
patentable subject matter under section 101 of the patent statute). In addition to
copyright and patent law, trade secret has been extended to protect computer
programs. See MGE UPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., Inc., No. 08-10521, 2010
WL 3769210, at *8 (5th Cir. 2010) (upholding the district court’s permanent injunction
against the defendant for copyright infringement and trade secret misappropriation of
the plaintiff’s software).
294
I.R.C. §§ 1221(a)(3)(A), 1231(b)(1)(C) (2006).
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Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1980).
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exclusion.296 Basing tax distinctions on intellectual property
297
uses would eliminate this outcome.
CONCLUSION
Federal tax rules governing intellectual property
evolved in the absence of an appropriate legal framework for
the intersection of intellectual property and taxation schemes.
As a result, the current intellectual property tax regime is
flawed on several grounds. Utilizing horizontal equity as a tax
policy analysis tool uncovers numerous differences in the tax
treatment of similar intellectual property owners, assets, and
transactions. Utilizing an appropriate efficiency standard to
evaluate tax subsidies for intellectual property (e.g., tax
expenditures in the form of deductions and credits) reveals that
many of the tax expenditures for intellectual property are
circumscribed to have limited effectiveness. Although some
aspects of the current tax scheme complement and promote the
intellectual property scheme, others hinder it and stifle
desirable intellectual property activity. Furthermore,
distinctions in the current tax system—different rules for
different types of intellectual property—have produced an
inflexible scheme not easily applied to evolving intellectual
property rights and practices, particularly transactions
involving integrated intellectual property.
A rational, coherent legal framework is needed for the
development of an intellectual property tax system that does
not violate fundamental equity and efficiency principles of tax
policy. In developing an appropriate framework for intellectual
property tax rules, the following questions should be asked:
First, should the taxation and intellectual property schemes be
harmonious (i.e., should the tax system be designed to support
the intellectual property system)? Second, if tax distinctions
among intellectual property are to be adopted, what is the basis
for making them?
296

For criticism of the current approach, see CHARLES EDWARD FALK, TAX
PLANNING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND LICENSING OF COPYRIGHTS, COMPUTER
SOFTWARE, TRADEMARKS AND FRANCHISES, A-26 to -27 (1997).
297
Interestingly, while the tax treatment of assignments of software and
design patents is impacted by intellectual property protections, the tax treatment of
developments and acquisitions of software and design patents is not. Costs of software
development, for example, are generally treated the same (deductible) regardless of the
method of protection available or obtained. See Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-2 C.B. 601. A
legal framework emphasizing intellectual property uses would avoid such a distinction
in the current tax system.

